The Numbers Game: Coca Cultivation in Colombia
by Travis Wheeler
on April 09, 2003
The State Department released findings February 28th showing that the cultivation of coca in Colombia decreased in 2002 from 169,800 hectares to 144,450, for a 15% decline after steadily rising rates for several years (including a 25% increase from 2000-2001). While a decline is positive, these figures are somewhat misleading. They mask shifts in production within Colombia and among Andean nations, do not take into account the humanitarian costs of the controversial aerial fumigation policy, and do not answer the question of long-term sustainability. Moreover, they mean relatively little next to one unbudging statistic: the availability of cocaine in the United States has remained stable despite billions of dollars appropriated for supply-side eradication.
In an important note, the most sustainable successes in eradication may be stemming from manual eradication with development aid. In Putumayo province, the center of the aerial fumigation program and the province with greatest reduction in coca, nearly one-half of the drop in coca production in 2002 was actually accomplished by manual eradication with alternative development. Coca was reduced from 47,170 to 13,725 hectares in 2002, and 14,296 hectares have been eradicated manually with US aid, and 11,520 hectares planted with legal crops (Office of the Governor of Putumayo, “For a Legal Putumayo with Social Justice and Zero Coca,” national coca crop census (SIMSI) figures). The farmers who manually eradicate and receive alternative development aid are obviously less likely to move to other areas to replant. The local government of Putumayo continues to press for community-based manual eradication with alternative development as the most sustainable and effective, as well as most humane, method of eradication.
This should be considered as the Congress reviews the 04 budget request for Colombia. In the request, social aid to Colombia, which includes alternative development assistance, has been cut from $164 million in 2003 to $150 million in 2004.
Problems with the coca cultivation figures:
- The policy impact must be measured regionally or globally, not country by country. The State Department=s figures show coca cultivation moving back into Peru and Bolivia, to the tune of some 2,000-3,000 hectares apiece—indicating an 8% drop in coca production regionally, not 15% as in Colombia.
- The policy impact must be measured over a longer time period. Coca cultivation in the Andes fluctuates from year to year, but has hovered around 200,000 hectares since 1988, according to the State Department figures. Since 1996, when large-scale US-supported fumigation began in Colombia, only four departments had more than 1,000 hectares of coca. Today, at least thirteen have that much coca—despite one million acres being sprayed since.
- Availability of cocaine in the United States, the rationale for the policy, remained steady. According to the Office of National Drug Policy’s “Pulse Check: Trends in Drug Abuse,” November 2002, the availability of crack cocaine and powder cocaine “remained stable” from fall 2001 – spring 2002, the latest period covered by Pulse Check.
- Moreover, while cocaine and crack use may be leveling off after a period of expansion, use of methamphetamine, a synthetic drug manufactured in the United States and Mexico, is increasing, according to Pulse Check (November 2002). Methamphetamine, which competes for the same users as cocaine, is especially problematic in western states and is on the increase in rural areas.
- The figures may not measure the replanting of coca in all areas outside of the target areas that were fumigated. According to the GAO, they are a representative sample of the target country’s known or suspected drug-growing areas (“Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia,” January 8, 2003). Historically, coca has been moved from one area of Colombia to another as eradication efforts forced farmers to pull up stakes. UN Drug Control Programme director for Colombia, Klaus Nyholm, notes that coca-growing is rising in regions bordering Putumayo province (Ibon Villelabeita, “Colombia’s New Coca Assault Hits Crops, Peasants,” Reuters, 2/26/03). Moreover, the satellite pictures upon which the estimate is based were taken directly after the largest spraying campaign ever seen in Colombia, before there was time for replanting. Cultivation may unfortunately bounce back somewhat in a short period.
- Measuring success in terms of hectares planted/eradicated does not take into account the increase in coca yield per hectare as higher-yield coca varieties are employed.Social, political & environmental costs:One of the factors behind the movement of coca is the lack of alternatives for coca farmers. US and Colombian-government sponsored alternative development programs lag far behind the spraying program; only a fraction of the areas sprayed are offered alternative development programs. Without alternatives, farmers replant, suffer hunger or pack up and leave, often to replant illicit crops elsewhere. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, referred in a March 5, 2003 speech in Bogota to 12,000 hectares of licit crops supported by USAID (not clear over what time period). The hectares sprayed in 2002 alone total 122,695, or ten times the figure given for USAID-supported alternative development projects.
Social, political & environmental costs:
One of the factors behind the movement of coca is the lack of alternatives for coca farmers. US and Colombian-government sponsored alternative development programs lag far behind the spraying program; only a fraction of the areas sprayed are offered alternative development programs. Without alternatives, farmers replant, suffer hunger or pack up and leave, often to replant illicit crops elsewhere. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, referred in a March 5, 2003 speech in Bogota to 12,000 hectares of licit crops supported by USAID (not clear over what time period). The hectares sprayed in 2002 alone total 122,695, or ten times the figure given for USAID-supported alternative development projects.
- Many of the areas targeted are farmed not mainly by traffickers, but by family farmers and indigenous communities. They have turned to this illicit living largely out of desperation. They are often migrants from other areas who moved due to economic hardship or political violence. The one source offering them rural credit, unfortunately, are the traffickers.
- Among the indicators of the social impact of fumigation is the dropout rate for children in Putumayo province (site of the most intensive spraying), which according to local officials, rose 40% since 2001 as parents could not afford to send their children to school or pulled their children out of school to follow them and grow coca elsewhere. Ibon Villelabeita, “Colombia’s New Coca Assault Hits Crops, Peasants,” Reuters, 2/26/03.
- Aerial fumigation with a broad-spectrum herbicide affects all plants, not just coca and poppy. Therefore, it kills the food crops that farmers intersperse with illicit crops. Most people in areas sprayed not only do not receive long-term development assistance, they also do not receive short-term food aid.
- Aerial fumigation campaigns have affected farmers who plant only food crops, including a number of alternative development projects, according to the Colombian government’s ombudsman’s office. While there is supposed to be compensation for farmers whose solely legal crops are destroyed, this mechanism does not exist in practice.
- Fumigation adds to the problem of displacement. According to the Washington Post, some 9,000 people fled Putumayo between January and November 2002 due to fumigation and a lack of alternative sources of income (Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Air Assault on Coca Leaves Crop, Farmers in Its Dust,” Washington Post, 11/13/02). In a country where 350,000 people were displaced in 2002 primarily due to political violence, a policy intentionally increases displacement should be controversial.
- While the State Department for years brushed aside complaints of impact to human health, the EPA found in September 2002 that the spray mixture being used could cause eye damage, a finding that found echo in the numbers of complaints of eye irritation that had been lodged with local Colombian government personnel. The spray mixture was changed to address this, but there are still many unknowns.
- As to environmental impact, according to Anna Cederstav, staff scientist with Earthjustice, “The widespread spraying and drift of a potent herbicide that kills most plants is devastating thousands of acres of important habitat in Colombia. The potential impacts to native flora and wildlife are unknown because the herbicide hasn’t been studied in these tropical ecosystems. Further, most coca and poppy farmers just replant or clear new plots in the forest. Because the State Department only reports on current crop acreage, there is no way to assess how the eradication program is accelerating the loss of Amazonian forests.” (“Coca Cultivation in Colombia: The Story Behind the Numbers,” press statement, 2/27/03)
- Eradication without alternatives is pushing farmers into the ranks of the armed groups, which feed on the desperation of rural communities by actively recruiting and offering food and a salary. This development runs counter to the goals of the policy, which included a strengthening of the state in rural areas. To consolidate support in the countryside, the Colombian government needs to make progress in delivering the most basic social services—health, education, roads, agricultural extension services—to extend a positive government presence in marginal areas.
The eradication program in Colombia has two major goals: reducing the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States, and helping the Colombian government reestablish control over the countryside. Yet despite the 2002 drop in coca production, to date the aerial fumigation policy does not appear to have made much progress towards those two major goals. On the first, cocaine use remains stable, while use of a similar drug, methamphetamine, appears to be on the increase. On the second goal, the policy will cut into the armed groups’ profits on the drug trade, but so far this does not appear to have a substantial impact. Moreover, fumigation without sufficient alternatives undercuts the Colombian government’s legitimacy in the countryside and is likely adding to the armed groups’ supply of recruits.
While the larger aim of limiting drug abuse is laudable, the tactics must be examined. This controversial and costly policy—Colombia is the only country in the world where large-scale aerial fumigation is applied—merits scrutiny. Is this the most effective policy with the least negative side effects? Could another eradication strategy, with greater attention to a sustainable demand reduction strategy through treatment and prevention, be more effective with less damage to people and the environment?
Ten Questions U.S. Policymakers Should Be Asking on Aid to Colombia
by Travis Wheeler
on January 17, 2001
The $1.3 billion aid package passed last year, marking a dramatic escalation of US involvement in Colombia, carries with it many risks and involves many unanswered questions. In the months leading up to its passage, the Clinton Administration and congressional backers painted an optimistic picture of the package's potential to help Colombia deal with its complex problems, while critics warned of dire consequences.
Now that the package is a reality, it would be wise to take a more careful look at the risks and uncertainties posed by this policy before appropriating more funding. Frequently, the questions asked about Colombia counternarcotics policy are limited in scope-is the right equipment being delivered on time? How many hectares of coca are being eradicated?
Here are ten unanswered questions policymakers should be asking.
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Colombia Funding in the President's 2003 Request for Supplemental Appropriations
by Travis Wheeler
on April 03, 2003
In March, 2003, the Bush Administration presented a special “supplemental” budget request to Congress to fund the war in Iraq. Included in this request was military aid for a number of other countries the administration considers allies in the war on terrorism—including $105 million in military aid for Colombia. Colombia had already received over $500 million in aid from the US for 2003. The memo below was written by LAWG and expresses concerns about this additional request. The bill was passed by the House and Senate on April 12, following an intense debate over the Colombia aid.
The President's March 25th request for supplemental appropriations for the war in Iraq includes a considerable sum for Colombia—$105 million.
The President in his request asked Congress to "refrain from attaching items not directly related to the emergency at hand." The Colombia funding is not directly related to the war in Iraq. Irrespective of one's stance on US Colombia policy, it would seem wiser and more appropriate to provide funding for Colombia through the regular appropriations process. Moreover, Colombia has just received over $500 million for '03 ($400 million in funding through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative in 03 as well as $99 million in foreign military financing). For 04 the President has requested over $700 million for Colombia ($313 million in interdiction, $110 million in foreign military financing, $150 million in social aid, some additional refugee assistance and an estimate of $120 million likely to be in the defense bill if similar to 03's request).
This supplemental funding deepens the involvement of the United States in Colombia's civil war and further tips the already unbalanced US package toward military/police assistance rather than social aid.
The supplemental includes the following funding specifically for Colombia:
$34 million for "Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities" under Department of Defense/Operation and Maintenance," to "fund increased operational tempo in Colombia's unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities."
$34 million under "Department of State/Other" for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative "to support extension of police authority to areas of the country that currently have little or no law enforcement presence, enhanced presidential security, bomb squad equipment, and for the unified campaign against narcotis and terrorism."
An estimated $36-37 million is included as part of the foreign military financing listed under "International Assistance Programs/International Security Assistance." A total of $2.059 billion would be provided for 19 countries, including Colombia.
The supplemental must be approved rapidly. Funding for Colombia should be carefully considered as part of the regular appropriations process.
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Rep. Schakowsky Sponsors Letter on Human Rights to Secretary Powell
by Travis Wheeler
on July 23, 2002
Secretary of State Colin Powell
The US State Department
2201 C Street
Washington, DC
Dear Secretary of State Powell,
We are writing to express our concern over the State Department’s decision to certify Colombia’s compliance with section 567 of the FY2002 foreign operations appropriations bill. We are not convinced that the evidence supports the contention that the Colombian military is suspending personnel credibly alleged to have committed serious human rights violations, cooperating with civilian judicial authorities, and taking effective measures to sever links with paramilitary groups. As you consider your decision on the second round of military aid, which we understand may be made in September, please take the following comments into consideration. The Congress included conditions in the FY2002 foreign operations legislation to ensure that the Colombian Armed Forces, which receive the bulk of the funds destined to Colombia through the Andean Regional Initiative, are respecting human rights.
We appreciate the State Department’s efforts to make clear to the Colombian government the importance of improving the human rights situation and meeting the specific requirements of section 567. We are dismayed, however, by the lack of response from the Colombian government. In particular, we are unconvinced that the short list of primarily lower-level soldiers and officers who have been suspended for human rights violations from January 2001 to April 2002 constitutes progress, given the substantial evidence against a number of high-level officers who remain on active duty despite credible evidence that they have tolerated, aided or abetted paramilitary forces. In addition, there is disturbing evidence that the Colombian attorney general lacks the political will to investigate and prosecute army officers implicated in grave violations.
The State Department’s report on the certification decision cited the appointment of General Rodrigo Quiñones to a military attaché position as evidence of progress. But, despite an outstanding decision by the Procuradería concluding that General Quiñones had planned and ordered the murders of at least 57 trade unions, human rights, and community leaders in the Barrancabermeja area in 1991-92, this officer remains on active duty. In 2000, troops under his command were implicated in helping paramilitaries to carry out the El Salado massacre. A year later, those same troops, with Quiñones as commander, allegedly allowed heavily armed paramilitaries to travel past them to Chengue, where paramilitaries committed a massacre. A Navy sergeant under Quiñones’ command was subsequently charged with supplying weapons to paramilitaries and helping coordinate the attack in Chengue. Quiñones was charged with ignoring detailed information received in advance about paramilitary movements near Chengue. The failure to investigate, prosecute, and punish high-level officers like Quiñones, General Gabriel Diaz, and others who are strongly implicated in aiding and abetting paramilitary forces has a profound impact on the attitudes of other members of Colombia’s military.
Events surrounding the Chengue massacre case also demonstrate the Colombian military’s continued resistance to cooperate fully with civilian justice officials. Prosecutor Yolanda Paternina Negrete, who led the Chengue investigation, told her superiors that officers in Colombia’s Marine Infantry failed repeatedly to provide her with the support necessary to search a ranch where witnesses claimed the paramilitaries responsible for the massacre were located. On May 27, 2001, two investigators working on the case were detained by known paramilitaries and are now presumed dead. On August 29, 2001, Prosecutor Paternina herself was killed by unidentified gunmen in Sincelejo, Sucre. The office in Colombia of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights called these killings “a systematic campaign of retaliation and intimidation” by those seeking “total impunity for the most serious crimes committed in the country.”
We are also disturbed by the characterization of army actions in Barrancabermeja as an example of progress in breaking army-paramilitary ties. Despite the high concentration of security forces in Barrancabermeja, the city remains under virtual paramilitary control. Paramilitaries move freely through the city, issue rules of conduct, and exert control over the civilian population, who live in an atmosphere of terror.
We would like to see further evidence of what happens after paramilitary troops are captured. We understand that the numbers of paramilitary captures reported by the Colombian Ministry of Defense has increased. It is important to analyze whether those captured are prosecuted and punished, or released; as well as whether some high-ranking officials are among those captured and prosecuted.
We believe that the Colombian government’s failure to act effectively to sever army-paramilitary ties, despite pressure from the U.S. State Department and the requirements of section 567, bodes ill for the future of U.S.-Colombian military cooperation and for the protection of human rights in Colombia. Moreover, we have been assured that U.S. assistance and training would promote the professionalism of the Colombian military and improve the human rights record of the Colombian military. To date, we believe there has been little progress. Again, we urge you to take our concerns into account when determining whether to approve additional military aid for Colombia this year.
Sincerely,
Jan Schakowsky
Sherrod Brown
Barbara Lee
James McGovern
Lane Evans
Joe Wilson
George Miller
Jesse Jackson, Jr.
Marcy Kaptur
Stephen Lynch
Maurice Hinchey
Lloyd Doggett
William O. Lipinski
James Leach
Rosa DeLauro
Zoe Lofgren
Bobby Rush
Tom Lantos
Lynn Woolsey
Maxine Waters
Tom Sawyer
Jose Serrano
William Coyne
Bernard Sanders
Ciro Rodriguez
Sam Farr
Donald Payne
James Oberstar
Rod Blagojevich
Michael Doyle
Nita Lowey
John Conyers
Cynthia McKinney
Jerry Kleczka
Dennis Kucinich
Elijah Cummings
Patsy Mink
Robert Borski
Tammy Baldwin
David Wu
William Lacy Clay
Ed Markey
Howard Berman
Nick Rahall
Danny Davis
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