LAWG/LAWGEF Statements, Memos, and Speeches

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To: Foreign Operations staffers
From: Lisa Haugaard

As you consider assistance for Colombia in the foreign operations appropriations bill for FY07, we hope the following information is useful. We strongly support continued assistance for Colombia, but believe it is imperative to readjust the aid package that has been primarily focused on military aid and aerial spraying (82% of U.S. aid since 2000 has been military/police aid).

1. Despite $4.7 billion invested by the United States in Colombia, the amount of coca planted in Colombia in 2005 was more than when funding began in 2000 (136,200 hectares at the start of Plan Colombia in 2000; 144,000 hectares at the end of 2005, according to the State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2005). Farmers whose crops are sprayed by aerial eradication who are not given adequate economic alternatives are replanting, and coca production is spreading all over the countryside. Coca production in 2005 increased in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. If the goal is to reduce drug abuse at home, resources must be redirected to treatment and prevention at home, and sustainable development alternatives abroad.
2. Human rights violations remain grave. While there is some reduction in violence due to the demobilization of paramilitary forces, human rights violations continue to be severe in Colombia. The number of people fleeing their homes from political violence increased 8 percent from 2004 to 2005, estimated at 318,387 people displaced in 2005 by the Consultancy on Displacement and Human Rights (CODHES). Moreover, in 2005 more grave violations than in previous years were committed directly by Colombia’s security forces, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ office in Colombia. The office reported “an upward trend” in allegations of extrajudicial executions of civilians and alteration of crime scenes by members of the army.
   
   
   Cases were denounced of coordinated actions in which the victims were allegedly handed over by paramilitaries, subsequently executed by members of the military, and then presented as members of armed groups killed in combat, particularly in the metropolitan area of Medellín (Antioquia). Another modality was observed in allegations regarding victims executed by paramilitaries and presented by members of the army as killed in combat, in Putumayo and in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. (United Nations’ Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, January 20, 2006, covering the year 2005, Part I, point 29)
3. Paramilitaries’ criminal and drug-trafficking structures remain largely intact. The demobilization of Colombia’s abusive paramilitary forces if permanent would be a very positive development, but these forces are far from completely dismantled. The OAS monitoring mission has documented the formation of new paramilitary groups and the participation of demobilizing paramilitaries in violent activities in five Colombian provinces, including committing massacres, forming new criminal bands and offering security services to drug traffickers. Paramilitary leaders have penetrated some local and national government structures; the former head of Colombia’s civilian intelligence agency, for example, is facing allegations that he colluded with a paramilitary mob boss in assassinations of civic leaders. Human rights groups and victims’ representatives have had their offices broken into and computer databases stolen, and some have received threatening messages from self-proclaimed new paramilitary groupings. The José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective, for example, which litigates high-profile human rights cases such as the Mapiripán massacre, received this message recently:    “This is an invitation to join our crusade against terrorism or your staff will suffer the full weight of our presence, we have the support of the government’s armed forces who always supported us… And to everyone who received a copy of this message I warn you if you don’t align yourselves with this reality it is better for you to take your humanitarian ideas and go to some other place outside of our sacred Colombian territory…”In another recent example, fifteen students, employees and teaching staff at the University of Antioquia just received a death threat from the Autodefensas Unidas de Antioquia, believed to be operating since 1999 (Amnesty International alert 23/023/2006, 16 May 2006).

How should U.S. policy and aid be improved?

In FY07, US assistance should prioritize alternative development and humanitarian aid:

• increase focus on alternative development for a more sustainable impact on drug production, rather than pouring resources into expensive, ineffective and inhumane aerial eradication campaigns
• increase focus on the victims of violence: humanitarian aid for internally displaced persons and Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities
• channel assistance to efforts to strengthen justice, including funding for the Colombia office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and for the Colombian government’s ombudsman’s office, inspector general’s office, and the Attorney General’s human rights unit and unit to implement prosecutions under the paramilitary demobilization law.

In addition, U.S. policy should get tougher in insisting that the Colombian government end impunity and thoroughly dismantle paramilitary and drug trafficking structures:

• enforce the human rights conditions in law, requiring the Colombian government to make much greater efforts to investigate and prosecute members of the security forces credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations, and greater efforts to sever all links between the armed forces and illegal armed groups; and
• insist that the Colombian government make much more vigorous efforts to fully dismantle paramilitary groups and their financial, criminal and drug trafficking structures; confiscate their financial assets and, particularly, the vast areas of land which they have obtained through violence; return lands to Colombia’s internally displaced persons; and investigate and prosecute new illegal paramilitary groups that are being created.

Additional assistance for expensive helicopters or more military training beyond the enormous investment Colombia already receives will only drain resources from these important goals and will not help Colombia reduce drug production or provide the necessary support to the justice system to strengthen the rule of law.

For more detailed recommendations, see Blueprint for a New Colombia Policywe published with the Center for International Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, and the U.S. Office on Colombia, with input from Colombian civil society organizations.

The State Department released findings February 28th showing that the cultivation of coca in Colombia decreased in 2002 from 169,800 hectares to 144,450, for a 15% decline after steadily rising rates for several years (including a 25% increase from 2000-2001). While a decline is positive, these figures are somewhat misleading. They mask shifts in production within Colombia and among Andean nations, do not take into account the humanitarian costs of the controversial aerial fumigation policy, and do not answer the question of long-term sustainability. Moreover, they mean relatively little next to one unbudging statistic: the availability of cocaine in the United States has remained stable despite billions of dollars appropriated for supply-side eradication.

In an important note, the most sustainable successes in eradication may be stemming from manual eradication with development aid. In Putumayo province, the center of the aerial fumigation program and the province with greatest reduction in coca, nearly one-half of the drop in coca production in 2002 was actually accomplished by manual eradication with alternative development. Coca was reduced from 47,170 to 13,725 hectares in 2002, and 14,296 hectares have been eradicated manually with US aid, and 11,520 hectares planted with legal crops (Office of the Governor of Putumayo, “For a Legal Putumayo with Social Justice and Zero Coca,” national coca crop census (SIMSI) figures). The farmers who manually eradicate and receive alternative development aid are obviously less likely to move to other areas to replant. The local government of Putumayo continues to press for community-based manual eradication with alternative development as the most sustainable and effective, as well as most humane, method of eradication.

This should be considered as the Congress reviews the 04 budget request for Colombia. In the request, social aid to Colombia, which includes alternative development assistance, has been cut from $164 million in 2003 to $150 million in 2004.

Problems with the coca cultivation figures:

• The policy impact must be measured regionally or globally, not country by country. The State Department=s figures show coca cultivation moving back into Peru and Bolivia, to the tune of some 2,000-3,000 hectares apiece—indicating an 8% drop in coca production regionally, not 15% as in Colombia.
• The policy impact must be measured over a longer time period. Coca cultivation in the Andes fluctuates from year to year, but has hovered around 200,000 hectares since 1988, according to the State Department figures. Since 1996, when large-scale US-supported fumigation began in Colombia, only four departments had more than 1,000 hectares of coca. Today, at least thirteen have that much coca—despite one million acres being sprayed since.
• Availability of cocaine in the United States, the rationale for the policy, remained steady. According to the Office of National Drug Policy’s “Pulse Check: Trends in Drug Abuse,” November 2002, the availability of crack cocaine and powder cocaine “remained stable” from fall 2001 – spring 2002, the latest period covered by Pulse Check.
• Moreover, while cocaine and crack use may be leveling off after a period of expansion, use of methamphetamine, a synthetic drug manufactured in the United States and Mexico, is increasing, according to Pulse Check (November 2002). Methamphetamine, which competes for the same users as cocaine, is especially problematic in western states and is on the increase in rural areas.
• The figures may not measure the replanting of coca in all areas outside of the target areas that were fumigated. According to the GAO, they are a representative sample of the target country’s known or suspected drug-growing areas (“Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia,” January 8, 2003). Historically, coca has been moved from one area of Colombia to another as eradication efforts forced farmers to pull up stakes. UN Drug Control Programme director for Colombia, Klaus Nyholm, notes that coca-growing is rising in regions bordering Putumayo province (Ibon Villelabeita, “Colombia’s New Coca Assault Hits Crops, Peasants,” Reuters, 2/26/03). Moreover, the satellite pictures upon which the estimate is based were taken directly after the largest spraying campaign ever seen in Colombia, before there was time for replanting. Cultivation may unfortunately bounce back somewhat in a short period.
• Measuring success in terms of hectares planted/eradicated does not take into account the increase in coca yield per hectare as higher-yield coca varieties are employed.Social, political & environmental costs:One of the factors behind the movement of coca is the lack of alternatives for coca farmers. US and Colombian-government sponsored alternative development programs lag far behind the spraying program; only a fraction of the areas sprayed are offered alternative development programs. Without alternatives, farmers replant, suffer hunger or pack up and leave, often to replant illicit crops elsewhere. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, referred in a March 5, 2003 speech in Bogota to 12,000 hectares of licit crops supported by USAID (not clear over what time period). The hectares sprayed in 2002 alone total 122,695, or ten times the figure given for USAID-supported alternative development projects.

Social, political & environmental costs:

One of the factors behind the movement of coca is the lack of alternatives for coca farmers. US and Colombian-government sponsored alternative development programs lag far behind the spraying program; only a fraction of the areas sprayed are offered alternative development programs. Without alternatives, farmers replant, suffer hunger or pack up and leave, often to replant illicit crops elsewhere. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, referred in a March 5, 2003 speech in Bogota to 12,000 hectares of licit crops supported by USAID (not clear over what time period). The hectares sprayed in 2002 alone total 122,695, or ten times the figure given for USAID-supported alternative development projects.

• Many of the areas targeted are farmed not mainly by traffickers, but by family farmers and indigenous communities. They have turned to this illicit living largely out of desperation. They are often migrants from other areas who moved due to economic hardship or political violence. The one source offering them rural credit, unfortunately, are the traffickers.
• Among the indicators of the social impact of fumigation is the dropout rate for children in Putumayo province (site of the most intensive spraying), which according to local officials, rose 40% since 2001 as parents could not afford to send their children to school or pulled their children out of school to follow them and grow coca elsewhere. Ibon Villelabeita, “Colombia’s New Coca Assault Hits Crops, Peasants,” Reuters, 2/26/03.
• Aerial fumigation with a broad-spectrum herbicide affects all plants, not just coca and poppy. Therefore, it kills the food crops that farmers intersperse with illicit crops. Most people in areas sprayed not only do not receive long-term development assistance, they also do not receive short-term food aid.
• Aerial fumigation campaigns have affected farmers who plant only food crops, including a number of alternative development projects, according to the Colombian government’s ombudsman’s office. While there is supposed to be compensation for farmers whose solely legal crops are destroyed, this mechanism does not exist in practice.
• Fumigation adds to the problem of displacement. According to the Washington Post, some 9,000 people fled Putumayo between January and November 2002 due to fumigation and a lack of alternative sources of income (Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Air Assault on Coca Leaves Crop, Farmers in Its Dust,” Washington Post, 11/13/02). In a country where 350,000 people were displaced in 2002 primarily due to political violence, a policy intentionally increases displacement should be controversial.
• While the State Department for years brushed aside complaints of impact to human health, the EPA found in September 2002 that the spray mixture being used could cause eye damage, a finding that found echo in the numbers of complaints of eye irritation that had been lodged with local Colombian government personnel. The spray mixture was changed to address this, but there are still many unknowns.
• As to environmental impact, according to Anna Cederstav, staff scientist with Earthjustice, “The widespread spraying and drift of a potent herbicide that kills most plants is devastating thousands of acres of important habitat in Colombia. The potential impacts to native flora and wildlife are unknown because the herbicide hasn’t been studied in these tropical ecosystems. Further, most coca and poppy farmers just replant or clear new plots in the forest. Because the State Department only reports on current crop acreage, there is no way to assess how the eradication program is accelerating the loss of Amazonian forests.” (“Coca Cultivation in Colombia: The Story Behind the Numbers,” press statement, 2/27/03)  
• Eradication without alternatives is pushing farmers into the ranks of the armed groups, which feed on the desperation of rural communities by actively recruiting and offering food and a salary. This development runs counter to the goals of the policy, which included a strengthening of the state in rural areas. To consolidate support in the countryside, the Colombian government needs to make progress in delivering the most basic social services—health, education, roads, agricultural extension services—to extend a positive government presence in marginal areas.

The eradication program in Colombia has two major goals: reducing the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States, and helping the Colombian government reestablish control over the countryside. Yet despite the 2002 drop in coca production, to date the aerial fumigation policy does not appear to have made much progress towards those two major goals. On the first, cocaine use remains stable, while use of a similar drug, methamphetamine, appears to be on the increase. On the second goal, the policy will cut into the armed groups’ profits on the drug trade, but so far this does not appear to have a substantial impact. Moreover, fumigation without sufficient alternatives undercuts the Colombian government’s legitimacy in the countryside and is likely adding to the armed groups’ supply of recruits.

While the larger aim of limiting drug abuse is laudable, the tactics must be examined. This controversial and costly policy—Colombia is the only country in the world where large-scale aerial fumigation is applied—merits scrutiny. Is this the most effective policy with the least negative side effects? Could another eradication strategy, with greater attention to a sustainable demand reduction strategy through treatment and prevention, be more effective with less damage to people and the environment?

Washington, DC – This Thursday, Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe will meet with President Bush at his Texas ranch. On Uribe's agenda will be firming up support for billions of dollars in future aid from the United States and his request for millions more to support his plans to demobilize up to 20,000 paramilitary fighters.

"The United States should not be such a pushover in its dealings with the Colombia government," commented Latin America Working Group Education Fund director Lisa Haugaard. "We should get some real progress in strengthening the rule of law in exchange for our billions of dollars in assistance."

Military aid on hold. The White House will be lauding Colombian President Uribe’s accomplishments. But a little-known story is that 12.5% of last year’s military aid was frozen for half the year over lack of progress in cases involving extrajudicial executions and other abuses by Colombia’s military. Under pressure from the U.S. embassy, two cases slowly advanced – on July 12, formal charges were brought against soldiers of the U.S.- funded 18th Brigade for the extrajudicial execution of three trade union leaders in August 2004, and on June 30, arrest warrants were issued for soldiers in the shooting deaths of five members of a family, aged 6 months to 24 years old, in Cajamarca in April 2004. However, this is slow progress, made reluctantly after the Colombian government initially said the unionists died in combat and the family was killed accidentally. Many other cases go nowhere. For example, little progress has been made in investigating the case of two families in San José de Apartadó who were murdered and their bodies dismembered in February 2005, with evidence, according to witness, pointing to soldiers, and the high-profile Mapiripán massacre case is still dragging through the courts.The State Department’s decision to certify that Colombia meets the human rights conditions for the remaining FY04 military aid and 12.5% of FY05 military aid will be controversial. (75% of U.S. military aid through the foreign aid bill is sent without conditions; the remaining 25% is subject to the human rights conditions in law, requiring that the Colombian government make progress in investigating and prosecuting security force members engaged in gross violations of human rights or collaboration with paramilitary forces.)A letter sent by 22 Senators on July 1st called for Secretary Rice “to refrain from certifying that the Colombian government meets the human rights conditions… until further progress is demonstrated.” Click here to see the letter.

"The State Department should use the leverage it has—not give away the store," said Lisa Haugaard. "The price of U.S. assistance should be respect for human rights."

Demobilization funding. President Uribe will also likely be asking for U.S. funding for a controversial plan to demobilize paramilitary fighters. Since 2002, the Colombian government has been engaged in negotiations with illegal paramilitary organizations under the umbrella of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the AUC. The AUC is a major drug trafficking organization, and is also on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations.

In June, the Colombian congress approved a “justice and peace” law that will serve as the legal framework for the ongoing negotiations. The law virtually ensures impunity for paramilitary leaders who have committed human rights and drug trafficking crimes. It provides generous benefits for paramilitary leaders who demobilize, without requiring that they fully dismantle their organizations. Prosecutors will have only 60 days to investigate and charge demobilizing commanders for the atrocious crimes they are alleged to have committed. In Colombia, similar investigations routinely take a year or two before charges are formally filed. Commanders who fail to fully confess their crimes or turn over illegally obtained assets will still enjoy minimal sentences. Commanders do not have to ensure that the men under their command demobilize.

"Of course we support a just and lasting peace in Colombia. That is precisely why, with regret, we have to urge our government not to provide support for the paramilitary demobilization under the current conditions," said Lisa Haugaard. "Where is an honest balance between peace and justice? Where is the truth commission, as in most serious peace processes, or a role for victims in justice and reparations? Most importantly, where is there a guarantee that the paramilitary leaders and drug traffickers will not retain, or even strengthen, their hold over Colombian society? This demobilization is a series of disturbing, unanswered questions. Under these conditions, we should not foot the bill."

Recommendations. The Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy, Washington Office on Latin America and U.S. Office on Colombia produced a Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy that makes ten recommendations for improving U.S. policy to the country.

For more information, contact: Lisa Haugaard, 202-546-7010.

The $1.3 billion aid package passed last year, marking a dramatic escalation of US involvement in Colombia, carries with it many risks and involves many unanswered questions. In the months leading up to its passage, the Clinton Administration and congressional backers painted an optimistic picture of the package's potential to help Colombia deal with its complex problems, while critics warned of dire consequences.

Now that the package is a reality, it would be wise to take a more careful look at the risks and uncertainties posed by this policy before appropriating more funding. Frequently, the questions asked about Colombia counternarcotics policy are  limited in scope-is the right equipment being delivered on time?  How many hectares of coca are being eradicated?

Here are ten unanswered questions policymakers should be asking.