by Travis Wheeler
on November 17, 2008
To: Foreign Policy Aides
From: Lisa Haugaard
Although it was heartening to learn the news of the freeing of FARC kidnap victims in July, many other indicators of human rights in Colombia remain extremely troubling. The rate of internal displacement in Colombia accelerated in 2007 compared to the previous year, and remains at record-breaking levels in 2008, indicating that the war continues to rage in the countryside, brutally affecting the civilian population. Threats and attacks against human rights defenders continue, with assassinations of trade unionists increasing in 2008. Killings of civilians by the army escalated in 2007 and erupted into a major scandal in the last two months, forcing the government in October 2008 to announce long overdue dismissals of officers and resulting in the resignation of the head of the army. Paramilitary forces, despite the demobilization, exercise control in many parts of the country and threaten and abuse communities. Guerrillas are hard hit by army offensives but still exert control over territory, plant landmines, kidnap, and kill.
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by Travis Wheeler
on September 18, 2007
Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group Education Fund
At Lutheran World Relief’s Forum on "Conflict, Trade and Development in Colombia"
Colombia’s conflict has led to more than 3.8 million people fleeing their homes from violence in recent years, and has caught the civilian population in the crossfire. Given this context, policymakers and donors should ask the following questions as they make decisions about rural development projects or trade agreements with Colombia. This may seem obvious, but too often trade and development decisions are not examined in a “human rights and conflict-resolution” light.
Some key questions for any major development or trade decision in Colombia today are:
- How will it affect human rights?
- Will it help to reduce tensions or aggravate the conflict?
- How will it affect the rural population living in poverty in the conflict zones?
- How will it affect the livelihoods of farmers susceptible to growing coca and poppy? Will it undercut their food crops, leading them to shift towards or revert to illicit drug production, or become more vulnerable to recruitment by guerrilla, paramilitary or other illegal groups?
- What guarantees are included to ensure this project does not favor criminal networks?
- How will it benefit or harm the population—rural, poor, Afro-Colombian, indigenous, internally displaced—already most victimized by the conflict?
- We can not assume that any development project or trade agreement, even if it looks to have an overall positive economic impact, will necessarily ease the conflict. We have to examine the different impacts on particular sectors and geographic regions.
To take the most controversial first…
The pending free trade agreement. Even the most vehemently pro-free trade advocate will acknowledge that some sectors may suffer impacts from trade agreements while other sectors benefit. Which sectors are least likely to benefit from the Colombian FTA, at least initially? A good guess would be, areas of the country without the infrastructure for successful exporting, and sectors of the population least prepared to take advantage of opportunities to export crops and goods favored by a trade agreement—and in particular, small farmers whose crops will not be able to compete domestically with U.S. exports. And these potential losers are likely to be located in Colombia’s conflict zones, and be the population already most victimized by the war, and most likely to be pressed into service by illegal armed groups or lured into illicit drug production.
After pouring so much energy and money into counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, including into the controversial aerial spraying program—have the U.S. and Colombian governments really considered carefully the potential impact the FTA would have on illegal drug production in the conflict zones?
And then there is the question of labor rights. Colombia is not by coincidence the country where more trade unionists are killed than in the rest of the world combined. Often trade unionists are targeted by those who believe trade union activity is illegitimate, by those who equate organizing with insurgency. In some cases, members of the army and security agency have collaborated directly in anti-union violence. Because of this climate, trade negotiations must be linked to measurable improvements in respect for labor rights, reduction in anti-union threats and violence, and an end to impunity in such cases.
Development projects. Those preparing development projects obviously should consider projects aimed at improving livelihoods in Colombia’s conflict zones. Development projects, designed in careful consultation with beneficiaries, should be benefit the population most victimized. This would include Colombia’s enormous internally displaced population, as well as Afro-Colombian, indigenous and other population living in the conflict zones.
But beyond this general aim, the following human rights guarantees would be helpful:
- Ensure that the project not be carried out on land obtained by violence. Substantial numbers of the over 30,000 paramilitaries demobilized still possess the land they stole by violence—yet a serious discussion of return of land to the displaced has yet to take place in Colombia. As paramilitary leaders demobilize under the Justice and Peace law, which in theory obligates them to disclose their illegally gotten gains, including land, most are turning out to be mysteriously impoverished. Little is being turned over to the national reparations commission. The Colombian government should revoke benefits for paramilitary leaders who refuse to disclose their assets, especially land, and should take steps to identify stolen land and plan for voluntary, safe returns where desired by internally displaced persons. But in the meantime, international donors should avoid investing in land obtained by violence. And this is not just a matter of checking title, since many titles have been obtained through threats and corruption. Special attention should be paid to protecting collective lands of Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.
- Ensure that the project not largely benefit criminal networks. This seems obvious, but is trickier than it appears. Paramilitary or criminal networks are reported to have taken over health sector activities in certain areas, for example. Threats and violence have often been alleged to have accompanied the expansion of African palm plantations, used for biofuel. Where there is a "gold rush" factor, as in biofuel or extractive industries, those seeking to dominate the business have all too often turned to violence to reach their goals. Even otherwise legitimate businesses may be making payoffs to guerrilla or paramilitary groups that contribute to violence.
- Ensure that any industry or agroindustry invested in or supported respects labor rights, does not collude with illegal armed actors in anti-union violence, and upholds freedom of association.
- Avoid resorting to "militarized development." The expansion of Colombia’s civilian government institutions into conflict zones is urgently needed. Funding militarized development, with civic action activities carried out by the army or military-led development projects, may be tempting where donors are concerned about security risks. But this is not a healthy development strategy, and will not win the support of the civilian population in the conflict zones in the way that can be accomplished by civilian-led development projects with community consultation.
Given the complex scenario of violence in the countryside, and in particular the reports of paramilitary or mafia-like ex-paramilitary networks increasing their control over local economic activities and political institutions, donors like USAID should ensure that even rural development contractors and subcontractors are fully briefed on the local human rights situation in the areas they consider for projects.
All of these caveats do not mean the international community shouldn’t provide aid and invest in development projects in Colombia. To the contrary. The United States in particular has an obligation to assist Colombia, given that our demand for illegal drugs helps to fuel their violence. The U.S. Congress’s increased interest in rural development programs in Colombia takes the U.S. aid program in a more promising direction. The right kind of rural investment—participatory and aimed at the population victimized by the conflict—is absolutely central to help resolve the conflict and stem the production of illegal drugs. However, the context of violence means that major trade or development decisions in Colombia must be viewed through this human rights and conflict-resolution lens.
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by Travis Wheeler
on April 10, 2008
To: Foreign Policy Aides
From: Lisa Haugaard
As the debate on the free trade agreement for Colombia heats up, the true human rights tragedy that is still taking place in that country should not be ignored. It is essential for the United States to insist upon improvements in human rights in Colombia, not to paint a rosy picture to secure a trade agreement. U.S. policy must take responsibility for the behavior of security forces trained with U.S. taxpayer dollars; take into account the continued suffering of the civilian population in the midst of an ongoing conflict; and support the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparations after a decade of atrocities. Here is a summary of recent human rights concerns.
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by Travis Wheeler
on May 15, 2007
To: Foreign Policy Aides
From: Jennifer Trowbridge
As the paramilitary demobilization process in Colombia unfolds, there has been a surge in the unearthing of mass graves. Paramilitary leaders have not, to date, fulfilled their obligation under the demobilization law (Law 975, or the Law of Justice and Peace) to disclose all information they have on abuses – including the exact locations of mass graves. However, some lower-level demobilized combatants have come forward with information on clandestine grave sites that contain the remains of people murdered or “disappeared” by paramilitary groups, attempting to obtain procedural benefits in the demobilization process. Other grave sites are being revealed by survivors of violence. While the revelation of grave sites is positive, little progress has been made in investigating and prosecuting even the most severe human rights violations. Moreover, multiple problems exist within the forensic investigation process which limit the ability of Colombian officials to identify victims and implement justice.
The United States, as a major donor to Colombian judicial institutions and to the paramilitary demobilization process itself, should take steps to ensure that exhumations of mass graves follow proper investigative procedure with the ultimate purpose of positively identifying victims. (See page 3 for detailed recommendations for U.S. policy).
The Unit of Justice and Peace under the Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía) was created through Law 975, and is in charge of exhuming mass grave sites that are revealed by demobilizing combatants. It works in conjunction with the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalía, which handles the investigations of forensic cases revealed by anyone other than a demobilizing combatant. To date, the Unit of Justice and Peace has received information about the location of 3,710 grave sites. Forensic investigations of mass graves in Colombia have been plagued with the following problems:
- Despite the exhumations of 553 bodies by the Unit of Justice and Peace, only 13 have been positively identified. Although nearly 200 of the bodies found were reported to have been preliminarily identified by family or community members, only 13 have been identified with 100 percent scientific certainty. Bodies that are not positively identified cannot be returned to the family members of the victims, nor can the forensic findings be used as evidence in judicial proceedings. Unidentified bodies are re-buried in cemeteries as “No Name,” resulting in a “double disappearance” of missing victims. Failure to identify bodies defeats the purpose of forensic investigation, and exhumations that do not lead to identification of bodies should not be viewed as successful.
- It is unclear whether or not the exhumations carried out under the Fiscalía consistently follow proper scientific procedure. If improperly exhumed, damage to forensic evidence is often irreversible. This could account for the high number of exhumed bodies that have been left unidentified.
- To date there is no functioning registry of disappeared persons, which severely limits the ability of Colombian forensic teams to identify remains. While the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences is currently in charge of a registry, it is incomplete and not accessible to the public. Without a list of who is missing, it is extremely difficult to identify who has been found. The existence and consistent use of a database of disappeared persons by investigative bodies would reduce the task of identification to matching missing persons to found bodies, likely resulting in an increase of positive identifications.
- The Colombian intelligence agency, the Administrative Security Department (DAS), regularly conducts forensic exhumations. The DAS is Colombia’s intelligence agency, and is involved in counter-insurgency efforts. Neither the Colombian military nor the DAS, as participants in the country’s armed conflict, should participate in the forensic recovery of victims’ bodies. Any group that could be implicated in cases of violence cannot be trusted to collect impartial scientific evidence, nor to turn evidence over to prosecuting authorities.
- Regional offices of the Unit of Justice and Peace have run out of safe storage space for all of the exhumed remains. Many remains are placed in inadequate or insecure storage areas, leaving this forensic evidence susceptible to damage, or robbery. A functioning registry of disappeared persons would greatly reduce the surplus of bodies, since it would increase the speed of identification of remains and reduce the processing time of each case.
- At some sites, particularly in the northeast region of Colombia, perpetrators are digging up and re-burying human remains in anticipation of forensic investigations. The Fiscalía and other forensic authorities should prioritize cases in which this problem is anticipated. In cases where it is discovered that remains have been removed, a thorough investigation of the burial site should be conducted anyway. It is often possible to find traces of human remains left behind unknowingly by perpetrators that could help to identify the victims and/or prosecute the case.
- There is not always adequate protection for forensic workers and others involved in the exhumation process. In addition to the security threat that this poses directly to forensic investigators, inadequate protection often causes forensic teams to speed up their work. This may cause them to leave behind remains, and could contribute to the lack of identification of bodies.
- Families are not allowed to be present for exhumations carried out by the Unit of Justice and Peace. Families, who frequently request the exhumations to try to find the remains of their loved ones, should have the right to participate at each stage of the forensic investigation. They should be kept informed of the findings in a timely and accurate manner.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
The United States should take steps to ensure that mass graves in Colombia are properly exhumed, bodies are positively identified and forensic evidence is available for the prosecution of criminals.
- Congress should:
—Fund, through the Colombian government agency the Defensoría, the newly formed National Search Plan (Plan Nacional de Búsqueda), and insist that exhumations adhere to the procedures laid out in the plan. The Search Commission for the Disappeared – composed of Colombian governmental and non-governmental institutions – authored the National Search Plan in September 2006. The plan states that all forensic investigations should follow, in order, these procedures: a) Document missing persons; b) Search for missing persons or bodies; c) Recover human remains through exhumation; and d) Analyze and identify remains.
—Fund the establishment of an independent forensic lab at the University of the Andes in Bogotá.
—Support the creation and active use of a registry of missing and “disappeared” persons. If used by all Colombian agencies conducting exhumations, the registry would help to reduce the number of unidentified bodies found in mass graves and resolve storage problems.
- The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Colombia should:
—Insist that neither the DAS nor any branch of Colombia’s military conduct forensic investigations of mass graves.
—Urge the Colombian government to provide adequate security for forensic investigation teams. The government should also provide increased protection for witnesses who testify in judicial proceedings for demobilizing combatants.
—Encourage the Unit of Justice and Peace to allow participation by family members of victims at every stage of the investigative process.
Sources:
1. “Colombia busca a 10.000 muertos,” El Tiempo, April 24, 2007.
2. “Colombia busca a 10.000 muertos,” El Tiempo, April 24, 2007; “Este año se han exhumado 95 cadáveres de fosas comunes de victimas de paramilitares,” El Tiempo, July 27, 2006, and; “Cada cuatro días desentierran una fosa de paramilitares,” El Tiempo, November 20, 2006.
3. “Apreciaciones a las exhumaciones e investigaciones forenses realizadas por la Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz de la Fiscalía General de la Nación,” Equipo Colombiano Interdisciplinario de Trabajo Forense y Asistencia Psicosocial (EQUITAS), August 2006.
4. “Apreciaciones a las exhumaciones e investigaciones forenses realizadas por la Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz de la Fiscalia General de la Nación,” Equipo Colombiano Interdisciplinario de Trabajo Forense y Asistencia Psicosocial (EQUITAS), August 2006.
5. “Colombia busca a 10.000 muertos,” El Tiempo, April 24, 2007.
6. “Fosas comunes: secretos dolorosos,” Diario El Pais, January 7, 2007, and; “Descubren fosas comunes en antigua zona de ubicación de las Auc,” El Tiempo, March 17, 2007. “Los rostros de las fosas comunes,” La Semana, June 15, 2006.
7. “Trasteo de cadáveres” El Tiempo, July 17, 2006, and; “Mass graves unearthed in Colombia” BBC News, February 15, 2006.
8. “Plan Nacional de Búsqueda,” Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas, September 2006.
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by Travis Wheeler
on September 26, 2007
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by Travis Wheeler
on January 10, 2007
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