Since August 2006, when Fidel Castro transferred power to his younger brother Raul, talk of “transition” has once again been at the forefront of discussions on U.S.-Cuba policy. For some, “transition” signifies a constitutional succession in Cuba; but for others, including the Bush Administration, true “transition” could only come with a regime change.
Despite these differences, one thing is certain: the power transfer in
Cuba is official. With Raul Castro as the head of state in Cuba, the
United States has an unprecedented opportunity to reconsider its policy
toward the island. A new diplomatic strategy should take into account
not only the shortcomings of current policy, but also the historical
experiences of other “transitional” countries around the world.
The republics of the former Soviet Union provide us with some
information about one model of transition. Today, we must urge our
policy-makers to examine these lessons learned—both successes and
failures—and apply them to a new model for U.S. policy toward Cuba, in
order to ensure policy goals include engagement and respect for
sovereignty.
Policy toward Cuba throughout the Cold War was geared toward isolation.
The rationale for implementing a comprehensive economic embargo was
dictated by the fear that the Cuban socioeconomic model would appeal to
other Latin American countries. In light of the geopolitical
environment of the Cold War, the fear of Cuba’s influence in the
region, at least in part, explained a policy aimed at isolating the
island from the United States, Latin America, and eventually the rest
of the world.
At the end of the Cold War, geopolitics changed. The 1960 U.S.-Cuba
policy is now even more outdated and irrelevant. The fear of Cuba’s
model spilling over into other countries can hardly be termed a
threat—though its example of standing up to the United States still
appeals to developing nations. The rhetoric used to justify Cuba policy
changed from fear of communism to support for democracy and human
rights and thus the conditions demanded by Washington in order to
normalize relations with Cuba also changed. From the 1960s and into the
late 1980s, the key security issues outlined by the United States were
Cuban troops in Africa, exporting revolution to Latin America, and
Cuban military security ties with the Soviet Union. The resolution of
these issues was considered a precondition for any alteration in
existing policy. Today, these security concerns are irrelevant. Cuban
troops are no longer active in Africa, Cuba is no longer engaged
militarily in Latin America, and the Soviet Union no longer exists.
Still the embargo stands.
In an October 2007 speech at the U.S. State Department, President Bush
discussed his conditions for engagement with Cuba: “As long as the
regime maintains its monopoly over the political and economic life of
the Cuban people, the United States will keep the embargo in place.” He
also stated: “To further that effort [to] break the hold of the regime,
the United States is prepared to take new measures right now to help
the Cuban people directly -- but only if the Cuban regime, the ruling
class, gets out of the way.” The word “freedom” has become the central
concept in the latest policy justification. President Bush further
articulated his understanding of freedom as freedom of speech, freedom
of association, freedom of the press, freedom to form political
parties, freedom to change the government through periodic multiparty
elections, and the release of all political prisoners.
Yet, these firm words from the president are only the latest in a
series of demands for Cuba. The United States has demonstrated an
uncanny ability to alter the conditions to which Cuba must adhere in
order to gain favor and normalize relations. All the while, the United
States has pressed forward with a policy of isolation. The future of
relations seems likely to follow this same trend, even now that Fidel
has resigned. Raul Castro is perceived by the administration as the
same as his brother and statements by embargo supporters indicate that
economic reforms Raul might institute would not alter their stance. In
a panel discussion at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research on January 15th, 2008, Nilda Pedrosa from the office of
Senator Mel Martinez (R-FL) expressed her absolute disapproval of even
considering economic engagement with Cuba without first seeing total
political reform. Kristen Madison, of the U.S. Department of State,
echoed Ms. Pedrosa’s sentiments by stating that the United States
should only consider economic engagement with Cuba when it is possible
to influence the island politically. President Bush’s October 2007
speech on Cuba policy flatly stated that no change will occur in Cuba
policy, regardless of a change in power on the island or any economic
reforms.
If the United States were truly interested in promoting democracy,
freedom, and economic prosperity in Cuba--and not converting into
policy a vendetta held by the hard-line faction of the Cuban-American
community in south Florida as a pay-back for election favors—it would
ease or lift the embargo and remove travel restrictions and allow the
free exchange of ideas and people to occur.
The apparently seamless transfer of power from Fidel to Raul
demonstrates the resilience of the Cuban system. This resilience flies
in the face of U.S. policy, again proving the ineffectiveness of the
half-century strategy for dealing with the island. Continued
non-engagement is as detrimental to U.S. interests in Cuba today as it
is detrimental to Cuban civil society—in whatever future Cuba chooses
for itself.
Action Center 
