Nongovernmental Letters on Human Rights and U.S. Aid to Colombia

Dear President Bush and Senator Kerry:

As representatives of a broad range of U.S. churches and faith communities we are calling upon you as a presidential candidate to commit to a serious reassessment of current U.S. policy towards Colombia. We believe it is time to envision a new strategy to respond to the needs of both nations and to work for the peace and security of our respective peoples.

Colombia is one of the most dangerous places on earth to be a religious leader, a promoter of peace, or human rights defender. The danger is consistently brought to light as astonishing numbers of religious and civil society leaders are assassinated, threatened and detained. The suffering of the Colombian churches and their call to us for assistance and solidarity compel us to appeal to you to seriously consider recommendations for a new U.S. policy toward Colombia that are outlined below.

We believe it is of great importance for the United States to remain engaged with the government of Colombia and Colombian civil society organizations, but to do so in a manner that will support aspirations for a just and sustainable peace as well as effectively address our shared concerns about drug production and consumption.

In this light, we respectfully urge you to include the following recommendations in a new vision for U.S. policy towards Colombia:

I. A greater commitment to a negotiated, political path towards peace.

After forty years of an ever-escalating armed conflict that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands, Colombian Catholic and Protestant church representatives have been clear that a negotiated political process, though difficult and contentious, is essential to the resolution of the current conflict. Every effort should be made to achieve a politically negotiated peace process inclusive of civil society participation, and based upon verification of ‘truth, justice and the provision of reparations for the victims of war.’

We call upon both Presidential campaigns to make a greater commitment to support Colombian and international efforts towards a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Colombia.

II. Increased attention to social concerns as a preferred long-term strategy to sustainable peace.

The conflict in Colombia and involvement of peasant farmers in coca production is deeply rooted in social and economic exclusion of many of its citizens. Many of the areas most in conflict have little or no social infrastructure or viable economic options. Strategies that rely primarily on military aid or fumigation, and provide only limited social investment in local communities, will not create lasting change.

The United States can make a significant positive contribution to long-term peace and stability in Colombia by shifting the focus of its foreign aid towards a much greater emphasis on effective social development. There are an increasing number of initiatives throughout the country of local governments, churches, and civil society coming together to create lasting alternatives to overt violence and the inequality and poverty that have sustained it. These initiatives, and the communities they serve, could greatly benefit from development funding – with long-term benefit for thousands of people.

The situation of internal displacement in Colombia is a crisis of staggering proportions – and one of the most serious in the world. Almost three million people have been displaced from their homes since 1985. Churches locally and internationally are responding to the great needs of Colombia’s internally displaced, a group that most aptly represents the human face of suffering in the country. We are grateful for the attention provided to refugees and internally displaced persons through U.S. aid, and see this as a positive contribution of U.S. policy toward Colombia. Yet much more remains to be done.

We call for a greater proportion of the U.S. aid to Colombia to be dedicated to investment in sustainable development, humanitarian aid and the defense of human rights.

III. Humane drug policies that meet the needs of those most directly impacted.

We share a deep concern about the consumption and production of illicit drugs. Billions of dollars have been spent on fumigation and interdiction yet, drug consumption continues unabated in our communities, drug offenses have exploded the prison populations, and treatment programs go under funded. This approach is not working.

The churches and faith communities in the U.S. and Colombia are painfully aware of the devastation of drugs in the lives of individuals, families and our communities. We see the end results every day and minister to affected families. It is precisely because we are so well versed in the human costs of the drug crisis that we are well placed to call for effective drug policies that will have lasting impact in all of our communities.

As the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s January 2004 Pulse Check Study of drug abuse in 25 U.S. cities states: powder and crack cocaine remains readily available and there are no clear positive trends on price and purity. As church organizations, we do not claim expertise on the best demand reduction strategies, but we urge you to shift the focus of current drug policy.

We call for increased drug treatment programs and realistic, pragmatic prevention strategies as a much more sustainable and humane way to achieve the goal of reducing drug abuse in the United States.

Thank you for your attention to the great courage and great needs of our Colombian brothers and sisters. We hope to work with you as we seek durable solutions for all affected communities.


Signed,

National Heads of Communion and Faith-Based Organizations

Rev. John L. McCullough
Executive Director and CEO
Church World Service

Rev. Dr. Robert Edgar
General Secretary
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA

Rev. Ronald D. Witherup, S.S.
President
Conference of Major Superiors of Men

Kathryn Wolford
President
Lutheran World Relief

Bruce Wilkinson
Senior Vice President
International Programs Group
World Vision

Rev. John Thomas
General Minister and President
United Church of Christ

The Reverend Mark S. Hanson
Presiding Bishop
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

James Winkler
General Secretary
General Board of Church and Society of The United Methodist Church

The Most Rev. Frank T. Griswold
Presiding Bishop and Primate
The Episcopal Church, USA

Rev. Dr. Clifton Kirkpatrick
Stated Clerk
Presbyterian Church (USA)

Rosanne Rustemeyer, SSND
Executive Director
U.S. Catholic Mission Association

Ken Hackett
President
Catholic Relief Services

Rev. Kenneth Gavin, S.J.
National Director
Jesuit Refugee Service/USA

Gail E. Mengel
National Board Minister
Church Women United

Carolyn Krebs, OP
President
Dominican Leadership

Marie Dennis
Director
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Joe Volk
Executive Secretary
Friends Committee on National Legislation

Jim Wallis
Editor
Sojourners Magazine

Arlene DiMarco
Vice President
National Council of Catholic Women
Harrisburg, PA

Maureen Fenlon, OP
National Coordinator
NETWORK, A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

Rev. Ron Stief
Minister and Team Leader
Washington Office
United Church of Christ Justice and Witness Ministries

J. Daryl Byler
Director
Mennonite Central Committee, Washington Office

Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton
Auxiliary Bishop,
Archdiocese of Detroit
Detroit, MI

Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory
Director
Washington Office
Presbyterian Church, (USA)

US Jesuit Conference

Richard Parkins
Director
Episcopal Migration Ministries

Executive Council, Sisters of St. Francis

Brian Terrell
Executive Director
Catholic Peace Ministry
Des Moines, IA

Krisanne Vaillencourt
Executive Director
Witness for Peace

Patricia Clark
Executive Director
Fellowship of Reconciliation USA

Jim Atwood
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

Sister Mary M McGlone
Executive Director,
FUVIRESE USA

Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondelet
Denver, CO

Dr. Monika K. Hellwig
President
Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities
Washington, DC

Phil Reed, M.Afr.
Coordinator, Justice and Peace Office
North American Province
Society of Missionaries of Africa

Dear Member of Congress,

As you act upon the President’s foreign aid request, we ask you to consider carefully the direction of Colombia policy.  It is not the time to turn away, as Colombia is in the midst of a tremendous social, political and economic crisis.  But three years after initial passage of Plan Colombia, it is time to assess the impact of US aid, and understand that significant changes are essential.

We ask the Congress to:

1. Insist that the Colombian government end collusion between the Colombian armed forces and paramilitary forces responsible for severe human rights violations. Army tolerance for and involvement in paramilitary violations continues—and so does impunity for such crimes, as detailed by the United Nations’ and State Department’s March 2003 human rights reports.  According to the State Department, "some members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of paramilitary groups—passing them through roadblocks, sharing intelligence, providing them with ammunition, and allegedly even joining their ranks while off duty." Remarkably little progress has been made since the passage of the first substantial aid package in 2000 to investigate, prosecute and sanction high-level military officials who face credible allegations of collusion with and tolerance of paramilitary forces. Indeed, the current Attorney General has removed diligent prosecutors and investigators from cases involving high-level army officials implicated in corruption and abuse. Moreover, the United Nations’ March 2003 report states that direct violations by the Colombian armed forces increased in 2002.
   
   In an implicit recognition that Colombia was not meeting the human rights conditions Congress established, the FY2003 omnibus appropriations bill removed the conditions from 75% of military aid. This sent a disturbing message: if you perform poorly, we will lower our standards on human rights.
2. Shift attention to the social side of the equation. As alternative development efforts barely begin to take root and the humanitarian crisis of Colombia’s internally displaced escalates, the administration proposes a decrease in the already inadequate social aid to Colombia (according to the International Affairs  budget request summary for FY04, from $164 million requested for  FY2003 to $150 million requested for FY2004).*  The Congress should:
   
   
   • Increase alternative development and phase out aerial fumigation. While the welcome drop in coca cultivation in Colombia was cited as an example of success of the aerial spraying program, 44% of the drop in the Putumayo region, the main focus of eradication efforts, was attributed by USAID statistics to manual eradication with alternative development. Many farmers who were fumigated and not provided aid of any kind—either emergency food aid or crop substitution programs—moved to neighboring provinces to grow illicit crops once more. Yet aerial fumigation far outpaces alternative development: the United States sprayed over 122,000 hectares in 2002 alone while promoting alternative development on 24,550 hectares from 2001 to the present. Manual eradication accompanied by alternative development is a more humane and effective response.
   • Increase aid to the displaced and insist on better protection and assistance to the displaced by the Colombian government. The number of people displaced by political violence increased dramatically to 412,000 displaced during 2002, with Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations strongly affected, according to the respected Colombian nongovernmental agency CODHES. The Colombian government’s “early warning system” which, with US funding, is supposed to protect communities and prevent displacement, has functioned poorly as a protection mechanism.  Although the system issues numerous alerts, it rarely results in effective intervention to protect endangered communities. The Colombian government by law is supposed to provide three months of assistance, which is inadequate for families to rebuild their lives.  However, many do not receive even this limited aid. Moreover, the Uribe administration has embarked upon a policy of returning people to their land regardless of risky security conditions. The US government should insist that the Colombian government increase the length and quantity of humanitarian aid to the displaced, adhere to a policy of voluntary returns in consultation with communities, and improve its response to alerts from at-risk communities. In addition, the United States should increase its aid programs for displaced people.
3. Insist that security measures do not undermine the democracy they seek to protect. The Uribe administration, in its efforts to strengthen security, has introduced measures that reduce democratic rights and constitutional guarantees. These included emergency measures that permitted arrests, searches, and wiretaps without warrants. These expanded powers have already been used in questionable ways to carry out arbitrary detentions and to search the offices of nongovernmental organizations engaged in legitimate civic activity.  When these measures were struck down by Colombia’s constitutional court, the Uribe administration introduced a package of constitutional reforms into the Colombian legislature which would grant the military the same powers. The US government should insist that measures to increase security do not undermine basic democratic rights and guarantees.
4. Call upon the Colombian government to increase efforts to protect threatened labor leaders, religious leaders and human rights defenders. Colombia continues to lead the world in assassinations of labor leaders, while human rights defenders, religious leaders and other civil society leaders are threatened and killed with frightening regularity by paramilitaries and guerrillas. The US government should press the Colombian government for progress in investigating and prosecuting those responsible for such threats and attacks. The US government should continue to fund the Colombian government’s program to protect at-risk labor and human rights leaders, but must insist upon improvements in this program, which has been hampered by bureaucratic delays. Moreover, the US government should insist that the Colombian government take actions to sanction civilian and military officials who endanger civil society leaders by publicly equating nongovernmental organizations with guerrilla forces–as high-level officials have done recently.
5. Step back from escalating military involvement. US military aid to Colombia has spiraled from $100 million in 1998 to $600 million this year. More US troops are on Colombian soil than ever before (almost 400). Last year, Congress expanded the military-aid mission beyond the drug war, to something resembling Central-America-style counterinsurgency. Yet after $2.5 billion since 2000—80 percent of it for Colombia’s military and police—there has been no change in the availability of drugs in the United States.  Colombia’s violence has only intensified, including in Putumayo and Arauca, the areas of greatest US and Colombian security focus.  Despite repeated requests from Congress, the administration has been unable to articulate a coherent vision of its goals for Colombia or how it plans to use US resources to achieve them. Before getting more deeply involved without sufficient debate, we urge the Congress to consider the complexity, danger and dimension of Colombia’s conflict. Faced with what could become an enormous, open-ended commitment, Congress should question whether an overwhelmingly military strategy can ever succeed. It is time to shift resources from security assistance toward eliminating the causes of violence by fostering rural development, economic opportunity, and civilian, democratic governance.
6. Adequately fund effective drug treatment and prevention programs in the United States.   US eradication efforts chase drug production from one province of Colombia to another, from one Andean country to the next. Making substance-abuse treatment available for all who seek it will help address the problem of drugs at home and lessen the profits that fuel violence in Colombia.

We urge you to consider taking these important steps to ensure US policy towards Colombia actually accomplishes its stated goals, including combating the problem of drugs and strengthening human rights, the justice system, and democratic institutions in Colombia.

Sincerely,

Kathryn Wolford
President
Lutheran World Relief

Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory
Director, Washington Office

Presbyterian Church (USA)

Patricia Forner
Advisor, Public Policy and Advocacy for Latin America and the Caribbean
World Vision

Kenneth Hackett
Executive Director
Catholic Relief Services

C. Richard Parkins
Director
Episcopal Migration Ministries

Adam Isacson
Director of Programs
Center for International Policy

Bill Spencer
Executive Director
Washington Office on Latin America

Charles Currie, S.J.
President
Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities

Rev. Ruth Chavez Wallace
Acting Executive & Program Associate for Latin America and the Caribbean
United Church of Christ and Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the United States and Canada

Rev. Ron Stief
Minister and Team Leader
Washington DC Office
United Church of Christ Justice and Witness Ministries

Brenda Girton-Mitchell
Associate General Secretary for Public Policy
National Council of Churches

Neil Jeffrey
Executive Director
US Office on Colombia

Daniel Kovalik
Assistant General Counsel
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO/CLC

Ed Clark
Executive Vice President
UNITE

Stan DeBoe, O.S.S.T.
Director of Justice & Peace
Conference of Major Superiors of Men

Matthew Wade S.M.
Associate Director
Conference of Major Superiors of Men

Natalia Cardona
Latin America Caribbean Program
American Friends Service Committee

Saul Murcia
Co-Director, Latin America and Caribbean Program
Mennonite Central Committee

Margaret Swedish
Director
Religious Task Force on Central America & Mexico

Stephen Coats
Executive Director
US/Labor Education in the Americas Project

Todd Howland
Director
Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights

Phil Anderson
Director
Guatemala Human Rights Commission-USA

Rev. Jerrye G. Champion
National Board President
Church Women United

Brian R. Hinman
Washington Representative
Church World Service

Marie Dennis
Director
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Ellen L. Lutz
Executive Director
Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

Joe Volk
Executive Secretary
Friends Committee on National Legislation

Patricia Krommer C.S.J. and Rev. Chris Ponnet
Co-Directors
Pax Christi USA, Los Angeles Chapter

Laura M. Furst
National Organizer
Committee for Inter-American Human Rights

Wes Callender
Director
Voices on the Border

Terry Collingsworth
Executive Director
International Labor Rights Fund

Melinda St. Louis
Advocacy and Campaigns Coordinator
Witness for Peace

School of the Americas Watch

Cristina Espinel and Barbara Gerlach
Co-Chairs
Colombia Human Rights Committee

Kevin Martin
Executive Director
Peace Action

Sanho Tree
Director
Drug Policy Project
Institute for Policy Studies

Rev. James E. Atwood
L. William Yolton
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

Roberto Pagán
President
Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores/SEIU

John Lindsay-Poland
Coordinator
Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean
Fellowship of Reconciliation

*Note: There is a lack of clarity regarding actual numbers of social aid for Colombia. Almost all social aid for Colombia comes from the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative, under INL, listed as "alternative development/institution building" in the International Affairs budget request summary for FY2004. That document lists a decline from $164 million requested for FY2003 to $150 million requested for FY2004 (p. 68).  AID's Colombia request remains nearly constant, from $151 million in FY2003 to $150 million in FY2004.  However, since other agencies besides AID draw from the ACI "alternative development/ institution building" account, a decline in that account suggests that the AID request is unlikely to be fully funded. In FY03, for example, ACI  funded AID, PRM (which includes important emergency assistance to displaced persons and refugees that supplements AID's longer-term aid to the displaced), DoJ, and INL programs considered "soft aid." It appears that AID Colombia programs were funded at approximately $117 million for FY03. Thus a decline in the ACI "alternative development/institution building" account could lead to less assistance for alternative development, aid to the displaced and other social aid.