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October 17, 2003
By Phil Peters, Vice-President, the Lexington Institute
The Cuba policy remarks President Bush delivered last
Friday were more notable for their embrace of Miami’s most hard-line,
first-generation segment of the Cuban exile community than for their relatively
modest substance.
First-generation exiles, grouped today in organizations
such as the Cuban Liberty Council (CLC), are the most vociferous proponents
of tough economic sanctions against Cuba. Most oppose any dialogue with
the Cuban government. Seeking “change not transition,” they
disdain the Varela Project, a petition drive conceived by Christian Liberation
Movement leader Oswaldo Paya, because it uses the Cuban constitution’s
citizen initiative provisions to press for a political and economic opening
and new elections under a new electoral law.
Many Cuban Americans of the first generation oppose
links with Cuba, even at the family level; the CLC opposes all travel
to Cuba and calls for a ban on financial support from Cubans abroad to
their families in Cuba today. Some Miami commentators refer to those Cuban
Americans who visit their families on the island as a “parallel”
exile community.
And they oppose the migration accords that President
Clinton negotiated with Cuba and that President Bush decided to uphold.
They strongly criticized the Bush Administration’s decision to repatriate
Cuban migrants who commandeered a Cuban research vessel in July in an
attempt to reach the United States. Because they are reliable single-issue
voters, their anger caused a political problem for the Bush White House
as it looks ahead to next year’s re-election campaign.
The President repeated two actions that he took when
he faced similar discontent in 2001. Then, he announced a “policy
review” that eventually produced only modest initiatives. Last week,
he named a commission composed of government officials, led by the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, that will
plan for a Cuban transition and seek ways to make it arrive sooner, and
will produce recommendations in six months.
As he did in July 2001 and May 2002, the President
announced last week that he would strengthen embargo enforcement. He said
federal agents would be “strengthening re-enforcement” of
travel restrictions, and the Department of Homeland Security announced
that it would inspect “all” travelers to Cuba as they depart
and as they return – a signal that Cuban Americans, who have faced
no penalties to date for violations of regulations governing travel and
delivery of family remittances, may now be scrutinized like other travelers.
One purpose of the inspections will be to ensure that
travelers do not carry excessive amounts of cash to Cuba. It is not clear
how stepped-up inspections of travelers will enforce these limits, especially
because the Administration relaxed them last March. Travelers are free
to carry up to $3,000 per person for delivery to Cuban households in the
form of remittances, and to spend unlimited amounts for expenses related
to the delivery of those remittances.
Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security, the
new super-agency designed to bolster defenses against terrorism, will
dedicate “intelligence and investigative resources” to nab
Americans who travel to Cuba through third countries.
The President also restated a commitment to delivering
information to Cuba, through the Miami-based Radio and TV Marti and other
means.
Notably, the President did not take steps long urged
by the CLC and Cuban-American members of Congress such as Rep. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen: imposing new sanctions against foreign nationals under the
Helms-Burton law, abrogating the U.S.-Cuba migration accords, or ending
all family remittances and travel to Cuba.
To compensate, he announced that the United States would
“increase the number of new Cuban immigrants we welcome every year,”
presumably beyond the 20,000 immigrant visas provided in the migration
accords. This initiative plays well in Miami, but it works against the
goal of promoting political change in Cuba because it focuses the minds
of discontented Cubans on the goal of leaving their country rather than
changing it.
Pointedly, the President made no mention of the Varela
Project. He praised three “brave dissidents” in Cuba, two
of whom oppose the Varela project. He did not praise Oswaldo Paya, who
one week earlier took the dramatic step of delivering 14,000 new signatures
to Cuba’s National Assembly.
President Bush also engaged in some hyperbole that appeals
to the hard-line constituency. He implied that Americans travel illegally
to Cuba to vacation at beach resorts; this surely occurs in some cases,
but it’s just as surely the case that most Americans who travel
to Cuba do so for reasons other than to seek a typical Caribbean beach
vacation. They explore Cuban cities, colonial architecture, and nature
areas, and have extensive interaction with Cuban people.
The President said that “our country must understand”
that hotel bills, paid in dollars, result in wages paid in “worthless
pesos” to hotel workers. In fact, while Cuba’s peso is not
a convertible currency, Cubans use pesos every day to buy food, pay utility
bills, and obtain services from government entities and private entrepreneurs.
The dollar-to-peso swap that the President cites is
a standard critique of the worker compensation system in joint ventures
between foreign investors and Cuban entities. It is of limited relevance
in the hotel industry, where only one in eight hotel rooms is part of
a joint venture.
Nonetheless, it tells only part of the story of compensation
in the joint ventures themselves. Through interviews with workers, Lexington
has documented that in mining, hotel, manufacturing, telecommunications,
and other joint ventures, Cuban workers are paid dollar bonuses tied to
productivity. A central fact of Cuba’s labor market is that Cuban
workers covet jobs in joint ventures because of these bonuses, and they
want to work in the tourism industry because of the dollar income they
earn from tips.
The President also claimed, without elaboration, that
“most goods and services produced in Cuba are still reserved for
the political elites.”
Reaction to the President’s speech was varied.
In Cuba, a leading dissident, Vladimiro Roca, took exception
to the notion that a U.S. commission might plan Cuba’s transition.
“We Cubans are the ones to decide about the transition,” he
said. “We are the ones to decide how we are going to do it.”
The President’s speech did not seek to build broad
support for his Cuba policy. It ignored many opposition figures in Cuba
who oppose U.S. sanctions, large parts of the Cuban American community
who favor engagement, and a growing element of the Republican party, which
either wants to reduce sanctions such as the travel ban, or to debate
the wisdom of the overall policy. For example, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Richard Lugar this month called for a broad debate
on Cuba policy and for ending the travel ban, “at the appropriate
time,” in order to “let more ideas flow into the country.”
It remains to be seen how well the speech will work
with its target constituency. Hard-line Cuban Americans applauded the
speech and the Cabinet-level attention to the Cuba issue; but some expressed
concern that there could be a gap between rhetoric and policy. The new
commission buys the Administration time, and initiatives that fill in
the blanks of the President’s speech can earn new political credit.
But pressures on the Administration are likely to continue
because Miami’s discontent owes less to the ins and outs of the
policy debate than to the fact that Fidel Castro has remained in power
for so many years. For the President’s target audience, as long
as that situation continues, no policy is tough enough.
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