We were in Guatemala during the week of October 20th, in order to assess the situation in the country in the weeks leading up to the November 9th elections. Following the disturbances that took place in Guatemala City on July 24th and 25th -- disturbances that most observers agree were explicitly organized by leading activists of the Guatemalan Revolutionary Front (FRG), the party lead by retired General Efraín Rios Montt -- WOLA has been concerned about the possibility that pre-election violence or political intimidation could affect the conditions for free and fair elections in Guatemala. We had heard a number of disturbing reports from both Guatemalan groups, and from international observers, particularly about events in rural areas. This trip was intended to evaluate the situation through meetings with both domestic and international election observers, and through interviews with human rights activists and others, both in the capital and in the countryside.

During our trip, we met with officials from the Organization of American States (OAS) election observation team, with staff for the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), staff for the Carter Center team in Guatemala, and the U.S. Embassy. We held meetings with the Guatemalan Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the vice-presidential candidate for one of the leading parties and the campaign manager for another, human rights groups in the capital, Mirador Electoral (the national Guatemalan citizen elections observation coalition), and with an official for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which is working with Mirador. In the countryside, we met with several regional MINUGUA officials, and with half a dozen local election observers who work with the Center for Legal Action on Human Rights (CALDH), a participant in the Mirador Electoral effort. We also observed a workshop, conducted in both Spanish and Quiche, designed to encourage voter turnout and to persuade voters that their vote would indeed be secret.

We heard very different assessments of the electoral situation from the various observers with whom we met. Most strikingly, international observers tended to be less concerned about the issues of violence and intimidation than did domestic ones. Below, we summarize our observations. A lengthier analysis will follow.

1) Anecdotal accounts of acts of violence and political intimidation are widespread. As several international observes emphasized, however, of the many reported incidents, relatively few have been proven to be directly related to the political campaign. Many of the incidents involved “common” rather than “political” crime. It is re-assuring that there have been few documented incidents of politically motivated violence, and it is important to counter alarmist opinions and to emphasize the relatively peaceful nature of the process to date.

Nonetheless, among Guatemalans, there is a great deal of fear and uncertainty in the air in the weeks immediately before the elections. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has received a number of formal complaints about politically related violence. Unfortunately, they have not investigated or publicly responded to any of these complaints, but have merely forwarded them to the Attorney General’s office. (And the Attorney General’s office has yet to carry out an investigation of the events of July 24th and 25th, much less of the other complaints.) The Guatemalan government, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the international observer groups ought to take steps to re-assure potential voters that they will be able to vote in peace and in secret. These steps include efforts to respond strongly to any acts of violence that do take place, to carry out investigations of complaints received, to publicize widely the presence of both national and international observers, to emphasize the measures that have been taken to ensure privacy in the polling place, and the measures that have been taken to ensure the security of the ballots and the tallying process.

2) It is possible that major acts of intimidation, like those that took place on the 24th and 25th of July, could take place again. While many international observers emphasized that the FRG had paid a high political cost for those events, both domestically and internationally, and that it was unlikely that the FRG would do anything similar again, other observers, particularly domestic observers, were less optimistic. (One observer, in this case an international, told us, “We’re all just waiting for the other shoe to drop.”) These observers noted that while the FRG may have suffered in opinion polls, it may well have succeeded in intimidating supporters of other parties in the capital and in rural areas. The FRG clearly retains the logistical capacity to carry out major disturbances; whether or not they do so has to do with party leaders’ judgments about the relative costs and benefits of these actions. It is premature to conclude that the costs will necessarily outweigh the potential benefits, particularly if the election appears to be close.

3) The mobilization of the former members of the Civil Defense Patrols (ex-PACs) has had a de-stabilizing effect on Guatemala. The mobilization was clearly intended to win political support for the FRG. FRG leaders were involved in the effort to mobilize ex-PAC members to demand that they receive financial compensation for their para-military service. The FRG government responded far more favorably to the demands of the ex-PACs than they have to the demands of the families of victims of the war. However, for a variety of reasons, pay-outs to the ex-PAC members have been delayed, or smaller than anticipated. This has caused resentment in some communities and among some ex-PAC members, and it is not clear that the mobilization of the ex-PACs has, in every case, helped the FRG electorally. (Further blunting the FRG’s advantage on this issue, all of the major political candidates have now promised to continue the payments to ex-PAC members.) Whatever the electoral impact, though, the mobilization of the ex-PACs has been de-stabilizing for the country. There have been take-overs of local town halls and riots in some communities; on October 26th, ex-PACs demanding payments kidnapped four journalists and held them hostage for several days. This has contributed to the general climate of insecurity in the country, and will present long-term security challenges for whoever is elected.

4) Political parties are clearly trying to win voter support through the use of financial incentives and, in many cases, the use of government resources. This is often described as “vote-buying” by Guatemalan observers. We got reports that all the political parties were seeking voter support by offering meals, clothing, and transportation. In many communities, local governments are distributing resources (fertilizer, building materials) as incentives. And both local and national governments are using last-minute public works projects to build support. While none of this is surprising (and much of it is behavior that political parties engage in not only in Guatemala but throughout Central America, and in
the United States as well), none of it ought to be acceptable, and both domestic and international observers ought to strongly condemn this type of behavior.

5) In recent months, election preparations and procedures have been carried out well. There have not been major problems in the voter registration process; local and regional election officials have been trained adequately. Security procedures for election day and for the vote count seem in place. Outright fraud seems unlikely. The TSE and the national and international groups that have advised them should be congratulated.

Unfortunately, there is a widespread perception that the TSE, though it has done a technically good job on organizing these elections, lost some of its credibility and became politicized during the disputes over the Rios Montt candidacy. The TSE will need to rebuild its image as an independent institution.

There is also some concern about how rural voters will get to the polls. Because the Guatemalan Congress failed to approve reforms in the location of polling places, many rural voters will have to travel long distances to reach their polling place. Political parties often organize transport for their own voters; there have been reports that the FRG has sought to rent out all the available buses in some rural areas, making it more difficult for other parties to bring in their supporters. Whatever the specifics of these charges, there are concerns about the availability of public transportation for rural voters.

6) Many Guatemalans and members of the international community have been concerned about the candidacy of former General Rios Montt, given his his human rights record, and what are widely considered to be the close connections between his political party, the FRG, and individuals and groups involved in organized crime, corruption, and human rights violation. Some with those concerns have taken heart at recent polls in Guatemala showing Rios Montt in third place. But the outcome of these elections is not clear. Polls show Oscar Berger and his Gran Alianza Nueva Nación (GANA) coalition in the lead, though short of the votes needed to win a simple majority and prevent a run-off. Public polls suggest that second place is likely to go to Alvaro Colom and the Undiad de la Esperanza (UNE) coalition. However, private polls indicate and many observers believe that Rios Montt and the FRG are not far behind Colom and could come in second place. Those concerned about a possible Rios Montt victory, given his human rights history, cannot rest easily.

7) Whoever wins the Presidency will face a difficult set of challenges in governing Guatemala. Many of the major institutions of the Guatemalan state – the courts, the Attorney General’s office, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal – are perceived as politicized and institutionally weak. Rebuilding the credibility of those institutions will be a major issue. In addition, whoever is President is likely to face a deeply divided Congress, since most observers believe that no party will gain a majority of Congressional seats. This will make the task of governing difficult.

8) The human rights situation in Guatemala has deteriorated significantly over the last two years. It has not improved during the election campaign. WOLA and many other observers believe that “hidden powers” -- powerful individuals and groups, including former military officers, with links to organized crime and drug trafficking, and with significant influence in the Guatemalan state -- are behind the current human rights problems. Most observers think that the “hidden powers” have relationships with all of the major political parties, which will make it difficult for any of the parties to play the aggressive role that will be needed to combat the problems of human rights violations and organized criminal activity. This makes calls for an internationally-sponsored investigation and prosecution of those responsible for human rights abuses in Guatemala all the more important.