by
Joy Olson, Latin America Working Group, June 2002
The Leahy Law is cited as an important mechanism as leverage to encourage
the investigation and prosecution of foreign security force members engaged
in human rights violations and to ensure that US aid and training does not
benefit such violators. There has been, however, relatively little testing
and monitoring of this mechanism. The following memo provides a case study
on Leahy Law implementation, including a description of the obstacles and
difficulties encountered in monitoring compliance with the law. It also
offers recommendations for other nongovernmental organizations, congressional
offices, scholars or journalists interested in tracking implementation or
evaluating the law’s impact.
The Latin America Working Group (LAWG) is a coalition
of over 60 U.S. nongovernmental organizations working together to coordinate
education and advocacy efforts on U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.
The coalition has a subgroup made up of representatives of the participating
organizations interested in U.S. foreign policy with Mexico. In recent
years, this subgroup has been dedicated to increasing the profile of human
rights issues in the official U.S./Mexico bilateral dialogue.
Over a year and a half, the Mexico subgroup of the Latin
America Working Group undertook a project to document implementation of
the Leahy Law in Mexico. The Leahy Law, which, in different forms covers
U.S. foreign assistance and defense programs, states that the U.S. cannot
provide training or other assistance to units of a foreign military credibly
accused of human rights abuses until action is taken against the accused.
U.S. embassies worldwide are responsible for implementing the law and
for vetting potential trainees and weapons recipients to ensure that weapons
and training are not being transferred to units of the host nation’s
military that might be implicated in human rights abuses. If action is
taken against the accused, training and other assistance could then be
given. The U.S. Embassy in Mexico uses both a database to vet potential
trainees as well as a review process that involves different sections
of the embassy.
The subgroup has a long-term relationship with a number
of nongovernmental human rights groups in Mexico. For a few years, we
encouraged these organizations to be in touch with the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico about cases of human rights violations involving the military.
While implementation of the Leahy Law was a priority for the subgroup,
local organizations had their own priorities and, over time, it was our
assessment that the local human rights groups did not regularly provide
the embassy with this information. The subgroup had no way of knowing
what information the embassy had obtained on human rights violations involving
the military or how they were responding to that information. Different
members of LAWG’s Mexico subgroup had participated in meetings with
the U.S. Embassy in Mexico and discussed the Leahy Law, but we needed
to find an accurate way to test the embassy’s claims that the law
was being implemented.
During the course of the investigation, LAWG compiled
information on over sixty cases of human rights violations allegedly involving
the Mexican military and submitted that information to the U.S. Embassy
in Mexico City. The process of submitting the information to the embassy
and their responses are documented below.
At the end of our investigation, we concluded that while
the U.S. Embassy had a mechanism to implement the Leahy Law, the embassy
was not trying very hard to collect the information needed to make the
law work. LAWG staff felt that the subgroup’s effort did push the
embassy to make a greater effort to implement the Leahy Law in Mexico;
however, implementation of this law in the long term cannot and should
not depend on the work of nongovernmental agencies like LAWG. The embassies
must be pressured to implement the law much more systematically.
November, 1999: The first task was to present the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico with a list of cases where the Mexican military was
the party accused of a human rights abuse. The first problem was that
no human rights group in Mexico was systematically tracking human rights
violations involving the military. There was no one place to go to collect
the information, so a LAWG staffer was sent to Mexico City to compile
an initial list of cases along with the basic documentation on those cases.
LAWG staff worked with human rights groups in Mexico City compiling information
on well-known cases documented by these groups and the press. The initial
list consisted of 12 cases, all high-profile cases, including the El Charco
massacre and the imprisonment of two environmentalist campesino leaders.
Our assumption was if the embassy were performing the most basic tracking
of human rights cases involving the military, these cases would appear
in the embassy’s database used to vet applicants for military training.
May 31, 2000: The LAWG sent a letter to Brian Nichols,
the deputy political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and
the official responsible for implementing the Leahy Law. The purpose of
the letter was to present an initial set of 12 cases and to “gauge
the effectiveness of the Leahy Law in Latin America.” The letter
asked the following questions,
Do these cases appear in the U.S. Embassy’s database
compiled to track human right abuses in Mexico?
Were the units allegedly involved in these cases ever
trained or otherwise assisted by the United States?
What further information does the embassy have regarding
the military’s involvement in cases in which a specific unit is
not identified?
What is being done in these cases to prosecute the accused,
and how does this relate to Leahy Law implementation (i.e. have accused
units been cleared to receive assistance because steps to prosecute them
have been taken)?
November 7, 2000: Mr. Nichols responded with a letter
to the LAWG, confirming that 7 of the 12 cases were included in the database,
that three were under further investigation, and that two have been excluded
due to insufficient information. Mr. Nichols states that the Defense Department,
“does not train Mexican units, but rather individuals,” and
that according to the embassy’s Military Liaison Office and the
U.S. Army’s School of the Americas, none of the 14 names mentioned
in the cases presented had received training.
This letter raised a number of questions, including
how the eEmbassy was collecting information on cases, whether individuals
or units were being vetted and who was already in the database. The LAWG’s
Mexico subgroup did not feel that they learned enough from this communication
and so undertook the compilation of more cases to present a more complete
picture.
LAWG contracted a person in Mexico to follow local press
reports, review human rights reports from local, state and national level
human rights NGOs and government human rights bodies and gather the documentation
on older and less prominent cases. Once again, LAWG did not independently
investigate any cases, but merely gathered documentation collected by
human rights groups, the press and the government’s own National
Human Rights Commission.
February 16, 2001: The LAWG submitted a second letter
to Mr. Nichols at the Embassy, then the political officer. This letter
presented 30 more cases, including some cases that went back to 1996.
This was done because in our view past human rights violators would not
be caught by the vetting process if the older cases were not included
in the vetting database. This is particularly important because there
were a number of human rights abuse cases involving the Mexican military
that dated from the mid-1990s.
The list submitted this time included a number of cases
where the government’s own National Human Rights Commission had
reviewed and made recommendations upon (by law the Commission cannot sanction).
These cases should have been easily identifiable by the U.S. Embassy and
would logically be eligible for the database.
To determine what embassy staff were doing to gather
information on their own, we asked how many of the cases from the first
set we submitted were in their database prior to our providing the information.
We also sought further clarification of the vetting
process with respect to units versus individuals. At the beginning of
the investigation we believed that while individuals were trained, the
vetting process considered the units in which the individual had participated.
The vetting process with respect to units and individuals became less
clear as the investigation continued.
The letter asked the following questions with regard
to the embassy’s response to the first letter:
Were the cases reported to be included in the Leahy
database there before we presented the information to the embassy?
What was the outcome of the three cases under investigation?
Why had the embassy decided not to include two of the
cases? (Both had been documented by a human rights group)
Can the embassy determine if any of the units a Mexican
soldier has belonged to in the past have been involved in human rights
violations? If so, does the embassy deny training to a soldier who was
in a unit when that unit committed a human rights violation?
Is there a standard procedure for making a determination
as to the validity of each case, which warrants inclusion in the database?
With respect to the new list of cases, we asked:
Are they in the database?
Do you have information on the alleged aggressor(s)
for cases where the alleged aggressors’ individual identities are
not indicated?
Do the units allegedly involved contain soldiers that
have been trained or otherwise assisted by the United States? Do you have
sufficient information to make that determination?
Does the embassy know what, if anything, is being done
in these cases to prosecute the accused or implement CNDH recommendations,
and how does this relate to Leahy Law implementation (i.e. have accused
units been cleared to receive assistance because steps to prosecute have
been taken)?
At the end of this process, LAWG staff met with and
delivered the findings from its study to Senator Leahy’s staff.
The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report accompanying the FY
2002 Foreign Aid Appropriations bill included the following language that
addressed some of the concerns raised by this investigation. The language
states:
The Committee has again included a provision, identical
to last year, which seeks to ensure that U.S. assistance does not go to
units of foreign security forces whose members have been credibly implicated
in human rights violations, unless the foreign government is taking effective
measures to bring the individuals responsible to justice. By effective
measures, the Committee intends that the individuals face impartial criminal
prosecution or appropriate and timely disciplinary action in accordance
with local law. The purposes of this provision are to reduce the chance
that U.S. training or equipment goes to human rights violators, uphold
the rule of law, and promote accountability for political crimes of violence.
The Committee is aware that some U.S. embassies have expressed confusion
about the meaning of ‘‘unit’’ for purposes of
this provision. The Committee intends that ‘‘unit’’
is to be construed as the smallest operational group in the field that
has been implicated in the reported violation. The Committee notes that
in order to implement this provision, it is necessary for U.S. embassies
to know which units are to receive U.S. assistance and to have in place
the necessary agreements and mechanisms to monitor their use of the assistance.
The Committee is concerned about the failure of some
U.S. embassies to put in place effective mechanisms for collecting evidence
and implementing this provision, and therefore believes that a centralized
system is clearly needed. Specifically, the Committee requests the Bureau
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to establish and maintain an electronic
database of credible evidence of gross violations of human rights by units
of foreign security forces. Each U.S. embassy should designate an appropriate
official to collect and submit data to the database from a wide range
of sources on a regular basis. Such a database would be one important
depository of evidence for making determinations regarding the implementation
of this provision, and should be accessible to other appropriate government
departments and agencies and the Congress.
During this year-and-a-half investigation, LAWG presented
62 cases to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to assess the
implementation of the Leahy Law. Our general conclusions were the following:
While the U.S. Embassy in Mexico had a process in place
to implement the Leahy Law—a database and a practice of consulting
with various embassy and State Department offices—they had not collected
the basic information needed to implement the law. If only four of the
first dozen cases that we presented were in the database prior to our
presentation of the information, we have little confidence that many of
the other cases we compiled were recorded by the embassy prior to our
research. While the structure for implementation was present, successful
implementation of the law could not happen because the information that
proposed trainees should have been vetted against did not exist.
Furthermore, the standard for including cases in the
Leahy Law database was never entirely clear. We had vetted the cases that
we provided to the embassy and eliminated any that did not have sufficient
information from a credible source to back them up. Even then, a number
of the cases were presented were not included in the database. And this
does not appear to be because action was taken by the military against
the accused. In only a handful of cases does anyone appear to have information
about action taken against the accused.
While embassy staff had good relationships with a number
of the Mexican human rights groups, they were not seeking out the information
needed to build an effective database.
Embassy staff reported that they never asked the Mexican
military for information about prosecutions. Without this information,
the law could not be fully implemented.
Embassy staff’s assertion that the vetting process
had landed them “no hits” was not shocking, considering how
little the database seems to have contained.
By continuing to provide the embassy with information,
LAWG took it upon itself to encourage the embassy to implement the law.
However, this was not a long-term solution. This law cannot be implemented
based on the investigation and presentation of information by an outside
source like the LAWG.
Is the Leahy Law implementation a priority for local
human rights groups?It likely won’t be, which will require more
work on the part of the U.S. NGO.
Is the embassy proactive in collecting data?
Is the embassy “actively retroactive” in
collecting case information?
How is “unit” defined?The intended definition
as explained in the above quoted Committee Report should be monitored.
Does embassy staff contact the military to determine
what unit might have been involved in various cases or to see whether
or not cases had been prosecuted by the military?
Coordinate your work with local human rights organizations.Having
someone on the ground to collect and track information is indispensable.However,
don’t assume that the local organizations will give implementation
of the Leahy Law the same priority you do.This is a U.S. law and it is
the responsibility of U.S. citizens to see that it is implemented.It may
also be dangerous for local organizations to track implementation of the
Leahy Law, and these risks must be carefully considered.
Try to ascertain the extent of information included
in the Leahy Law database before you begin. This may not be possible.
If not, try to assess how much new information you are providing for the
database.
Collect a list of cases, present them to the U.S. Embassy
in said country and ask if these cases are present in the database. Prior
to presenting cases you should check the Foreign Military Training Report
from the Departments of Defense and State covering 1998 to 1999, and 2001
to 2002. These were the years that the document did not classify information
on the foreign units trained. If you are familiar with units that have
been accused of abuse, look to see if they were trained. Monitor other
annual editions of the Foreign Military Training Report for information
on units trained.
Ask how many “hits” the database has received.
Ultimately you have to determine if lack of hits has to do with an inadequate
database, because there are not many human rights violations, because
the interpretation of unit is very restricted or because the host nation
military is not requesting training for questionable units.
Inquire about the interpretation of the Leahy Law being employed. Is the
database set up so that it checks both unit and individual. Are units
or individuals being vetted?
The Leahy Law covers security forces, military as well
as police forces. Our research was limited to cases involving the military.
If possible, form your research and inquiry to address both.
Try to write airtight questions. For example, in our
first inquiry we asked if the cases we presented were in the database.
We should have asked if the cases we were presenting were in the database
prior to presentation of the information, and then ask which cases were
added to the database, and if cases were not added, why.
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