In 2005, the Bush Administration will deepen US involvement in the Colombian conflict, and continue its hard-edged Cuba policy. Increasing tension with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is a possibility. However, the administration is likely to avoid conflict with the many Latin America center-left governments currently in power. Gradually increasing military aid and training to the region while cutting back on social aid is a disturbing, persistent trend.

Odd Man Out

Mr. Bush is “odd man out” among the center-left presidents currently governing much of South America. The gap between Mr. Bush and the continent’s leaders was symbolized by the tensions during Bush’s brief Latin America trip to attend the Pacific summit in Chile, where Chilean President Ricardo Lagos cancelled a state dinner, ostensibly over disagreements about the size of the US security force. Center-left governments preside over Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador. Hugo Chavez maintains his popularity, despite strong opposition in Venezuela. Carlos Mesa in Bolivia must tread carefully with strong popular movements, since their protests—over natural resource decisions and killings of protesters by the security forces -- led to the resignation of the previous president.

At another moment in history this center-left resurgence in Latin America could lead to a strong diplomatic and then military reaction from the United States. Mounting tensions are still a possibility. Yet three factors exist that make escalating US-Latin American tensions, apart from Cuba, unlikely. First, the Iraq war and continued tensions with Iran and North Korea suggest that even this combative US administration would be unlikely to take on a new challenge. Two, the leftist Latin American presidents have, by and large, proved to be moderate pragmatists. Only Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez is more confrontational in rhetorical terms towards the United States, but the ratification of his popularity in the 2004 recall referendum, deemed fair by international observers, make it more difficult for the Bush Administration to call his legitimacy into question. Three, Colombia’s conflict provides more than enough focus for the Bush Administration’s military programs in Latin America.

Deepening Involvement in Colombia

Mr. Bush’s quick stopover in Colombia on his return from Chile – on an island outside the historic port city of Cartagena, one of the Colombia’ s most secure places – indicates his strong support for conservative leader Alvaro Uribe. Bush will have to make the case this year why Plan Colombia, the United States’ massive, largely military aid package, should be renewed. Sold to the Congress as a five-year, one-time deal, the administration will argue that the plan needs to be extended. The administration will present statistics showing a drop in the number of acres planted in drug crops in Colombia, while sweeping under the rug the statistics that show that the price and availability of cocaine remains virtually constant in the United States. The administration will also portray Uribe as a strong ally in the war against terror, depicting Colombia’s decades-old conflict as another front in the US campaign against terrorism. The administration is likely to ask Congress to renew the more than $700 million dollar package to Colombia and the Andean region that it has sent each year since 2000.

US involvement in the Colombian conflict in 2005 deepens with the passage of legislation doubling the number of US troops permitted to 800 troops, along with 600 civilian contractors. Since the US troops are advisors, this represents an enormous investment in training and guiding Colombia’s army. The continued human rights violations, threats against human rights defenders and union leaders, and linkages between the army and rightwing paramilitary forces in the very area where the United States has a maximum presence – Arauca province, the location of the oil pipeline – is a source of great concern.

The Colombian government has begun a demobilization process for a part of the paramilitary forces. However, the demobilization is taking place before the Colombian Congress has approved legislation providing for a measure of truth and justice. The United States is beginning to fund this demobilization, and it is highly questionable how much the US Embassy will push to ensure that those leaders involved in massacres and major drug trafficking are prosecuted. The paramilitary demobilization process is a pressing human rights issue, because without truth, justice and accountability, the cycle of violence will begin again.

While the Bush Administration enthusiastically endorses President Uribe, many members of the US Congress continue to be concerned about the human rights record of the Colombian military, and this, and the process of paramilitary demobilization, will be a focus of debate throughout the year.

Cuba

The Bush Administration has shown no signs of softening its hard-edged Cuba policy. To the contrary, the administration is stepping up pressure. This has been seen in several areas:

• The latest toughening of the travel restrictions. These fell hardest on Cuban-Americans, who are now limited to one family visit every three years to the island – and their travel is restricted even if their mother falls ill or dies, for example. And the administration has re-defined “family” to exclude aunts, uncles, nieces, nephew, and cousins—very foreign to the Latin American definition of family.
• In an apparent effort to discourage US agricultural sales to Cuba, the Bush Administration halted in November the transfer of money to US agricultural firms making sales to Cuba and is reviewing its definition of a law requiring that Cuba make “payments in advance” for US agricultural imports. The proposed rule change, which would require Cuba to pay for US agricultural products before they are shipped, would reduce agricultural sales and possibly halt them altogether.
• Academic programs have been hit hard by tightened restrictions, which have effectively ended academic exchanges and study abroad that is shorter than a full semester and denied Cuban scholars visas to scholarly conferences.

These irrational restrictions are causing a backlash and will ensure a strong challenge this coming year by members of Congress, the academy, moderate Cuban-Americans, the business community, and the public.

In addition to regulatory actions affecting travel and agricultural sales, movement towards easing restrictions is likely to be hampered by the election of a Cuban American to the Senate, Senator Mel Martinez of Florida. His voice is likely to be used in the Senate to further the administration’s goals and policies regarding Cuba.

The Bush Administration may have ventured too far afield from the positions of some key sectors (academic, business/agriculture, Cuban Americans) and will be facing some strong resistance to its policies towards Cuba.

Immigration

One of the few areas affecting Latin America where the Bush Administration has announced an interest in exploring new solutions is immigration. President Bush has stated his interest in providing some path to legalization for illegal immigrants, although he is not expected to back any kind of comprehensive immigration reform. However, he is opposed by a number of members of his own party, who have been increasingly vocal in opposition to even minor steps towards immigration reform. Members of Congress attempted to place provisions cracking down on illegal immigration - for example, by denying driver's licenses to illegal immigrants - on the 9/11 intelligence reform bill. While they failed to include many of these provisions, the debate over immigration and border policy is likely to be intense in 2005. Already, proposals are circulating on Capitol Hill to tighten or reform our immigration system, promising heated debate around this issue.

Citizens' groups are likely to increasingly raise the humanitarian impact of tightened border policies on migrants, highlighting the many people who die each year attempting to cross the US-Mexico border. New proposals have begun to circulate that would ramp up border security and enforcement with increased technology, staffing and infrastructure in the region. These proposals will be a focus-point of fights to challenge the growing militarization of the region. This type of project pushes migrants into the most remote desert areas as they try to avoid detection by the Border Patrol, leading to an increase in deaths. The work will largely take place in the grassroots domain, as Congress is intent on increasing security in the post-9/11 world. Congress seems determined to push ahead with these security programs despite their proven inability to diminish the number of undocumented entries into the United States.

CAFTA and AFTA

The Central American Free Trade Agreement, already negotiated, was postponed for congressional action until after the November 2004 elections, given how unpopular a yes vote on CAFTA would be in certain congressional districts. Now, however, it is likely CAFTA will be brought to a vote. The Andean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is still being finalized and could be presented to the U.S. Congress this fall.

CAFTA is controversial not just because of the potential impact of the remaining textile jobs in the United States, but also because of the poor record of labor law compliance in Central America and concerns that its provisions will undermine small farmers in the region. AFTA is particularly controversial because Colombia leads the world in assassination of trade unionists, and unions will be questioning the rationale for signing an agreement where freedom of assembly is threatened through violence. While it is absent from debate, the potential impact of AFTA leading to renewed planting of drug crops due to increased competition affecting small farmers’ legal crops should be a subject for discussion.

Guatemala

The Bush Administration, concerned with corruption in the Portillo Administration, had lent support to an initiative to create an International Commission to Investigate Illegal and Clandestine and Security Apparatus (CICIACS). The Berger Administration, taking office in January 2004, formally supported the creation of CICIACS, but failed to vigorously pursue in the Guatemalan Congress ratification of the agreement establishing the commission. With the Guatemalan Congress failing to ratify CICIACS, progress on investigating these groups and individuals, believed to be behind corruption, drug trafficking and threats and attacks against human rights groups, is stalled.

The challenge for human rights in Guatemala will be how to encourage investigation of these groups and of the landmark human rights cases now that CICIACS seems to be blocked. The Bush Administration, encouraged by Berger’s cuts in the military budget and other steps, appears willing to ease up on pressure too quickly. In late 2004, the Congress included a provision in the foreign operations bill to permit use of the military aid (for “nonlethal” defense items) which had remained frozen “in the pipeline” after the United States initiated a ban on military aid to Guatemala in 1990. The pipeline aid can be released if the State Department certifies that there is progress on establishing CICIACS, on establishing a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Guatemala, and on instituting military reforms included in the peace accords. The Bush Administration may argue that these conditions are met and request Congress to lift the ban on military aid in 2005. Whether Guatemala has sufficiently instituted such military reforms will be a focus of debate this year.

Military vs. Development Aid

A disturbing trend to monitor is the US military’s increasing efforts to expand the roles of Latin American militaries. Despite the lessons of history – in which Latin American militaries with poorly defined roles instigated coups, conducted repression, and undermined the stability of governments—the United States continues to encourage Latin American militaries to be involved in public security efforts, tasks that should largely be left to the police. Also disturbing is the gradual drift upward in US military aid and training to almost all countries in the region.

At the same time as military aid gradually increases, development assistance has suffered cuts. Latin America does not benefit substantially from the Bush Administration’s most heralded new aid programs, the Millennium Challenge Account and the President’s HIV/AIDs initiative. Only three countries from Latin America are even being considered for the MCA program, and not even those three will all be included. Adding to the concerns about Latin America aid is the need to provide generous emergency and reconstruction assistance in response to the tsunami. Such assistance is absolutely essential, and should be a priority – but it should not come primarily from raiding the accounts of emergency and development assistance for other developing nations. As the Bush Administration announces a tighter budget for next year and searches for new aid for tsunami reconstruction, Latin America development assistance remains a vulnerable, easily “raidable” account.

Conclusion

Latin America is hardly at the top of the Bush Administration’s agenda. However, the administration’s single-minded focus on the war on terror, leading to deepened involvement in the Colombian conflict, escalating hardline measures towards Cuba, and justifying increasing military aid to the region, has a strong impact on the hemisphere.

By Lisa Haugaard, Mavis Anderson and Sean Garcia