In commemoration of International Women's Day, there will be two screenings of the film We Women Warriorsin Washington DC.
About the film: In Colombia's war-torn indigenous villages, three brave women from distinct tribes use nonviolent resistance to defend their peoples’ survival. Warfare between the guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and armed forces imperils Colombia's 102 aboriginal groups, dozens of which face extinction because of the conflict. Trapped in a protracted predicament that is fueled by the drug trade, native women are resourcefully leading and creating transformation imbued with hope. We Women Warriors bears witness to neglected human rights catastrophes and interweaves character-driven stories about female empowerment, unshakable courage, and faith in the endurance of indigenous culture.
As part of DC Independent Film Festival, a free screening of the film will take place on Friday, March 8th, at noon. We hope you can join us for the film and a discussion with filmmaker, Nicole Karsin, and Omar Martinez, LAWG staff member. Admission is free, but tickets are required.
When: Friday, March 8 at 12:00 pm Where: DC Independent Film Festival, Voice of America (VOA) Building Auditorium, Wilbur J. Cohen Building. 330 Independence Ave. SW, Washington DC Tickets: Click here to purchase your tickets for Friday’s screening. Click here for the promotional flyer.
The second screening will be on March 11th, at the Gala Hispanic Theatre with a panel discussion featuring LAWG Executive Director, Lisa Haugaard, WOLA's Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, USIP's Virginia Bouvier, and filmmaker, Nicole Karsin. Tickets are a minimum of $5 for this screening, with a suggested donation of $15-20.
When: Monday, March 11 at 7:30pm Where: Gala Hispanic Theatre, 3333 14th Street, NW, Washington DC Tickets: Click here to purchase your tickets. Click here for the promotional flyer.
By: Lisa Haugaard and Omar Martinez, Latin America Working Group
Peace Process Advances; Civil Society Involvement in Peace Negotiations—or Lack Thereof;Colombian Congress Approves an Enormous Setback for Justice; 2012: A Year of Ups and Downs for Labor in Colombia
Expanding Military Jurisdiction in Colombia: A Major Setback for Justice Versión en español.
January 28, 2013
Colombia’s recent passage [1] of a constitutional amendment that expands military jurisdiction in cases of human rights violations is a major setback for justice. The reform would allow grave human rights crimes to be investigated and tried by the military justice system, in direct conflict with years of jurisprudence of Colombia’s high courts and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [2].
U.S. Security Assistance and Human Rights in the Americas Today: This Much at Least Must Be Done
Statement by Lisa Haugaard, Executive Director, Latin America Working Group Education Fund at the Just the Facts Conference: Security, Civil-Military Relations, and U.S. Policy in the Americas Today
September 28, 2012
How do you ensure that U.S. security assistance supports and does not undercut human rights?
As a human rights advocate, my best answer is quite simple: The United States should not provide training and assistance to highly abusive military or police forces.
However, the U.S. government often does give assistance and training to abusive security forces.
In those cases, at an absolute minimum, there must be enforceable human rights conditions over all military and police assistance, through all sources, including through the Defense as well as State budget, and the State Department and the Congress must be willing to enforce them.
US Office on Colombia and Latin America Working Group Education Fund Applaud Steps towards Peace Negotiations in Colombia
We applaud the announcement that the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have agreed to begin formal negotiations. We salute Colombia in this effort to bring a negotiated end to the nearly 50-year-old internal conflict. We also are encouraged to hear the National Liberation Army’s (ELN) stated willingness to enter into peace talks.
We believe it is imperative that combatants and civilians alike be guaranteed the full application of human rights and international humanitarian law protections throughout this process.
A lasting peace requires addressing the root causes of the conflict. The peace process must include substantial space for civil society involvement and input, including by women, Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities and other sectors brutally affected by the war, in order to ensure that historic underlying economic and social conflicts and decades of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations by all parties to the conflict are addressed.
We hope that this initiative brings about the lasting peace with justice that Colombians long for and deserve.
On May 17, 2012, Lisa Haugaard, executive director of the Latin America Working Group Education Fund testified before the United States Congress Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission on the situation of human rights defenders in Colombia.
"The situation in 2012 continues to be grim," says Lisa Haugaard in the official testimony. "In the first three months of the year, 13 human rights defenders were assassinated, according to Somos Defensores, with 64 acts of aggression during that same period."
Hear LAWG's director talk on Chicago Public Radio's Worldview program about the "two Colombias": The one in which the war is winding down and all is going well; and the other one, in which hundreds of thousands of people are still fleeing their homes from violence, the army as well as guerrillas and paramilitaries are killing civilians, and the government is illegally wiretapping the institutions that are the basic building blocks of democracy.
Click here to listen to it on the Chicago Public Radio website.
Today, LAWGEF joined labor, environmental, human rights, development and faith-based organizations in submitting written comments to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in response to a formal request to the public for opinions on the pending trade agreement. In their comments, these groups outlined the specific human rights and labor problems in Colombia, and urged the Obama Administration to insist upon seeing fundamental improvements on these issues before going forward with a free trade agreement. Violence against trade unionists and other obstacles to worker rights were outlined by the AFL-CIO and US Labor Education in the Americas Project. Some groups also outlined the potential impact of the trade agreement on the rural poor, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.
Although it was heartening to learn the news of the freeing of FARC kidnap victims in July, many other indicators of human rights in Colombia remain extremely troubling. The rate of internal displacement in Colombia accelerated in 2007 compared to the previous year, and remains at record-breaking levels in 2008, indicating that the war continues to rage in the countryside, brutally affecting the civilian population. Threats and attacks against human rights defenders continue, with assassinations of trade unionists increasing in 2008. Killings of civilians by the army escalated in 2007 and erupted into a major scandal in the last two months, forcing the government in October 2008 to announce long overdue dismissals of officers and resulting in the resignation of the head of the army. Paramilitary forces, despite the demobilization, exercise control in many parts of the country and threaten and abuse communities. Guerrillas are hard hit by army offensives but still exert control over territory, plant landmines, kidnap, and kill.
As the debate on the free trade agreement for Colombia heats up, the true human rights tragedy that is still taking place in that country should not be ignored. It is essential for the United States to insist upon improvements in human rights in Colombia, not to paint a rosy picture to secure a trade agreement. U.S. policy must take responsibility for the behavior of security forces trained with U.S. taxpayer dollars; take into account the continued suffering of the civilian population in the midst of an ongoing conflict; and support the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparations after a decade of atrocities. Here is a summary of recent human rights concerns.
Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group Education Fund
At Lutheran World Relief’s Forum on "Conflict, Trade and Development in Colombia"
Colombia’s conflict has led to more than 3.8 million people fleeing their homes from violence in recent years, and has caught the civilian population in the crossfire. Given this context, policymakers and donors should ask the following questions as they make decisions about rural development projects or trade agreements with Colombia. This may seem obvious, but too often trade and development decisions are not examined in a “human rights and conflict-resolution” light.
Some key questions for any major development or trade decision in Colombia today are:
How will it affect human rights?
Will it help to reduce tensions or aggravate the conflict?
How will it affect the rural population living in poverty in the conflict zones?
How will it affect the livelihoods of farmers susceptible to growing coca and poppy? Will it undercut their food crops, leading them to shift towards or revert to illicit drug production, or become more vulnerable to recruitment by guerrilla, paramilitary or other illegal groups?
What guarantees are included to ensure this project does not favor criminal networks?
How will it benefit or harm the population—rural, poor, Afro-Colombian, indigenous, internally displaced—already most victimized by the conflict?
We can not assume that any development project or trade agreement, even if it looks to have an overall positive economic impact, will necessarily ease the conflict. We have to examine the different impacts on particular sectors and geographic regions.
To take the most controversial first…
The pending free trade agreement. Even the most vehemently pro-free trade advocate will acknowledge that some sectors may suffer impacts from trade agreements while other sectors benefit. Which sectors are least likely to benefit from the Colombian FTA, at least initially? A good guess would be, areas of the country without the infrastructure for successful exporting, and sectors of the population least prepared to take advantage of opportunities to export crops and goods favored by a trade agreement—and in particular, small farmers whose crops will not be able to compete domestically with U.S. exports. And these potential losers are likely to be located in Colombia’s conflict zones, and be the population already most victimized by the war, and most likely to be pressed into service by illegal armed groups or lured into illicit drug production.
After pouring so much energy and money into counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, including into the controversial aerial spraying program—have the U.S. and Colombian governments really considered carefully the potential impact the FTA would have on illegal drug production in the conflict zones?
And then there is the question of labor rights. Colombia is not by coincidence the country where more trade unionists are killed than in the rest of the world combined. Often trade unionists are targeted by those who believe trade union activity is illegitimate, by those who equate organizing with insurgency. In some cases, members of the army and security agency have collaborated directly in anti-union violence. Because of this climate, trade negotiations must be linked to measurable improvements in respect for labor rights, reduction in anti-union threats and violence, and an end to impunity in such cases.
Development projects. Those preparing development projects obviously should consider projects aimed at improving livelihoods in Colombia’s conflict zones. Development projects, designed in careful consultation with beneficiaries, should be benefit the population most victimized. This would include Colombia’s enormous internally displaced population, as well as Afro-Colombian, indigenous and other population living in the conflict zones.
But beyond this general aim, the following human rights guarantees would be helpful:
Ensure that the project not be carried out on land obtained by violence. Substantial numbers of the over 30,000 paramilitaries demobilized still possess the land they stole by violence—yet a serious discussion of return of land to the displaced has yet to take place in Colombia. As paramilitary leaders demobilize under the Justice and Peace law, which in theory obligates them to disclose their illegally gotten gains, including land, most are turning out to be mysteriously impoverished. Little is being turned over to the national reparations commission. The Colombian government should revoke benefits for paramilitary leaders who refuse to disclose their assets, especially land, and should take steps to identify stolen land and plan for voluntary, safe returns where desired by internally displaced persons. But in the meantime, international donors should avoid investing in land obtained by violence. And this is not just a matter of checking title, since many titles have been obtained through threats and corruption. Special attention should be paid to protecting collective lands of Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.
Ensure that the project not largely benefit criminal networks. This seems obvious, but is trickier than it appears. Paramilitary or criminal networks are reported to have taken over health sector activities in certain areas, for example. Threats and violence have often been alleged to have accompanied the expansion of African palm plantations, used for biofuel. Where there is a "gold rush" factor, as in biofuel or extractive industries, those seeking to dominate the business have all too often turned to violence to reach their goals. Even otherwise legitimate businesses may be making payoffs to guerrilla or paramilitary groups that contribute to violence.
Ensure that any industry or agroindustry invested in or supported respects labor rights, does not collude with illegal armed actors in anti-union violence, and upholds freedom of association.
Avoid resorting to "militarized development." The expansion of Colombia’s civilian government institutions into conflict zones is urgently needed. Funding militarized development, with civic action activities carried out by the army or military-led development projects, may be tempting where donors are concerned about security risks. But this is not a healthy development strategy, and will not win the support of the civilian population in the conflict zones in the way that can be accomplished by civilian-led development projects with community consultation.
Given the complex scenario of violence in the countryside, and in particular the reports of paramilitary or mafia-like ex-paramilitary networks increasing their control over local economic activities and political institutions, donors like USAID should ensure that even rural development contractors and subcontractors are fully briefed on the local human rights situation in the areas they consider for projects.
All of these caveats do not mean the international community shouldn’t provide aid and invest in development projects in Colombia. To the contrary. The United States in particular has an obligation to assist Colombia, given that our demand for illegal drugs helps to fuel their violence. The U.S. Congress’s increased interest in rural development programs in Colombia takes the U.S. aid program in a more promising direction. The right kind of rural investment—participatory and aimed at the population victimized by the conflict—is absolutely central to help resolve the conflict and stem the production of illegal drugs. However, the context of violence means that major trade or development decisions in Colombia must be viewed through this human rights and conflict-resolution lens.
To: Foreign Policy Aides From: Jennifer Trowbridge
As the paramilitary demobilization process in Colombia unfolds, there has been a surge in the unearthing of mass graves. Paramilitary leaders have not, to date, fulfilled their obligation under the demobilization law (Law 975, or the Law of Justice and Peace) to disclose all information they have on abuses – including the exact locations of mass graves. However, some lower-level demobilized combatants have come forward with information on clandestine grave sites that contain the remains of people murdered or “disappeared” by paramilitary groups, attempting to obtain procedural benefits in the demobilization process. Other grave sites are being revealed by survivors of violence. While the revelation of grave sites is positive, little progress has been made in investigating and prosecuting even the most severe human rights violations. Moreover, multiple problems exist within the forensic investigation process which limit the ability of Colombian officials to identify victims and implement justice.
The United States, as a major donor to Colombian judicial institutions and to the paramilitary demobilization process itself, should take steps to ensure that exhumations of mass graves follow proper investigative procedure with the ultimate purpose of positively identifying victims. (See page 3 for detailed recommendations for U.S. policy).
The Unit of Justice and Peace under the Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía) was created through Law 975, and is in charge of exhuming mass grave sites that are revealed by demobilizing combatants. It works in conjunction with the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalía, which handles the investigations of forensic cases revealed by anyone other than a demobilizing combatant. To date, the Unit of Justice and Peace has received information about the location of 3,710 grave sites. Forensic investigations of mass graves in Colombia have been plagued with the following problems:
Despite the exhumations of 553 bodies by the Unit of Justice and Peace, only 13 have been positively identified. Although nearly 200 of the bodies found were reported to have been preliminarily identified by family or community members, only 13 have been identified with 100 percent scientific certainty. Bodies that are not positively identified cannot be returned to the family members of the victims, nor can the forensic findings be used as evidence in judicial proceedings. Unidentified bodies are re-buried in cemeteries as “No Name,” resulting in a “double disappearance” of missing victims. Failure to identify bodies defeats the purpose of forensic investigation, and exhumations that do not lead to identification of bodies should not be viewed as successful.
It is unclear whether or not the exhumations carried out under the Fiscalía consistently follow proper scientific procedure. If improperly exhumed, damage to forensic evidence is often irreversible. This could account for the high number of exhumed bodies that have been left unidentified.
To date there is no functioning registry of disappeared persons, which severely limits the ability of Colombian forensic teams to identify remains. While the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences is currently in charge of a registry, it is incomplete and not accessible to the public. Without a list of who is missing, it is extremely difficult to identify who has been found. The existence and consistent use of a database of disappeared persons by investigative bodies would reduce the task of identification to matching missing persons to found bodies, likely resulting in an increase of positive identifications.
The Colombian intelligence agency, the Administrative Security Department (DAS), regularly conducts forensic exhumations. The DAS is Colombia’s intelligence agency, and is involved in counter-insurgency efforts. Neither the Colombian military nor the DAS, as participants in the country’s armed conflict, should participate in the forensic recovery of victims’ bodies. Any group that could be implicated in cases of violence cannot be trusted to collect impartial scientific evidence, nor to turn evidence over to prosecuting authorities.
Regional offices of the Unit of Justice and Peace have run out of safe storage space for all of the exhumed remains. Many remains are placed in inadequate or insecure storage areas, leaving this forensic evidence susceptible to damage, or robbery. A functioning registry of disappeared persons would greatly reduce the surplus of bodies, since it would increase the speed of identification of remains and reduce the processing time of each case.
At some sites, particularly in the northeast region of Colombia, perpetrators are digging up and re-burying human remains in anticipation of forensic investigations. The Fiscalía and other forensic authorities should prioritize cases in which this problem is anticipated. In cases where it is discovered that remains have been removed, a thorough investigation of the burial site should be conducted anyway. It is often possible to find traces of human remains left behind unknowingly by perpetrators that could help to identify the victims and/or prosecute the case.
There is not always adequate protection for forensic workers and others involved in the exhumation process. In addition to the security threat that this poses directly to forensic investigators, inadequate protection often causes forensic teams to speed up their work. This may cause them to leave behind remains, and could contribute to the lack of identification of bodies.
Families are not allowed to be present for exhumations carried out by the Unit of Justice and Peace. Families, who frequently request the exhumations to try to find the remains of their loved ones, should have the right to participate at each stage of the forensic investigation. They should be kept informed of the findings in a timely and accurate manner.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
The United States should take steps to ensure that mass graves in Colombia are properly exhumed, bodies are positively identified and forensic evidence is available for the prosecution of criminals.
Congress should:
—Fund, through the Colombian government agency the Defensoría, the newly formed National Search Plan (Plan Nacional de Búsqueda), and insist that exhumations adhere to the procedures laid out in the plan. The Search Commission for the Disappeared – composed of Colombian governmental and non-governmental institutions – authored the National Search Plan in September 2006. The plan states that all forensic investigations should follow, in order, these procedures: a) Document missing persons; b) Search for missing persons or bodies; c) Recover human remains through exhumation; and d) Analyze and identify remains.
—Fund the establishment of an independent forensic lab at the University of the Andes in Bogotá.
—Support the creation and active use of a registry of missing and “disappeared” persons. If used by all Colombian agencies conducting exhumations, the registry would help to reduce the number of unidentified bodies found in mass graves and resolve storage problems.
The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Colombia should:
—Insist that neither the DAS nor any branch of Colombia’s military conduct forensic investigations of mass graves.
—Urge the Colombian government to provide adequate security for forensic investigation teams. The government should also provide increased protection for witnesses who testify in judicial proceedings for demobilizing combatants.
—Encourage the Unit of Justice and Peace to allow participation by family members of victims at every stage of the investigative process.
Sources:
1. “Colombia busca a 10.000 muertos,” El Tiempo, April 24, 2007. 2. “Colombia busca a 10.000 muertos,” El Tiempo, April 24, 2007; “Este año se han exhumado 95 cadáveres de fosas comunes de victimas de paramilitares,” El Tiempo, July 27, 2006, and; “Cada cuatro días desentierran una fosa de paramilitares,” El Tiempo, November 20, 2006. 3. “Apreciaciones a las exhumaciones e investigaciones forenses realizadas por la Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz de la Fiscalía General de la Nación,” Equipo Colombiano Interdisciplinario de Trabajo Forense y Asistencia Psicosocial (EQUITAS), August 2006. 4. “Apreciaciones a las exhumaciones e investigaciones forenses realizadas por la Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz de la Fiscalia General de la Nación,” Equipo Colombiano Interdisciplinario de Trabajo Forense y Asistencia Psicosocial (EQUITAS), August 2006. 5. “Colombia busca a 10.000 muertos,” El Tiempo, April 24, 2007. 6. “Fosas comunes: secretos dolorosos,” Diario El Pais, January 7, 2007, and; “Descubren fosas comunes en antigua zona de ubicación de las Auc,” El Tiempo, March 17, 2007. “Los rostros de las fosas comunes,” La Semana, June 15, 2006. 7. “Trasteo de cadáveres” El Tiempo, July 17, 2006, and; “Mass graves unearthed in Colombia” BBC News, February 15, 2006. 8. “Plan Nacional de Búsqueda,” Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas, September 2006.
Palabras del Latin America Working Group en la apertura de la Tercera Asamblea del Movimiento de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado
Gracias por esta invitación, es un gran honor estar aquí con Uds. en esta importante evento. Me gustaría leer una breve declaración de organizaciones de derechos humanos, iglesias, agencias humanitarias y organizaciones no-gubernamentales de los Estados Unidos:
Nosotros apoyamos a las víctimas de violaciones de derechos humanos en Colombia por el valiente trabajo que realizan en búsqueda de la verdad, la justicia y las reparaciones integrales. Damos la bienvenida a la Tercera Asamblea del Movimiento de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado y sus valiosos esfuerzos por contribuir a la construcción de una sociedad más justa. La verdad y la justicia no son obstáculos para el camino de la paz. Más bien, son la base fundamental para una paz duradera en Colombia. Estamos juntos a las víctimas de la violencia en su reclamo por descubrir la verdad, consolidar el Estado de Derecho y decir, “Nunca mas”.
Quería añadir que para nosotros, organizaciones de la sociedad civil estadounidense, es particularmente importante ofrecer nuestra solidaridad porque nuestro gobierno con demasiado frecuencia piensa que el camino a la paz está através de la guerra y que el camino a la verdad está a través de la historia oficial.
Pero no voy a decir mas, porque estoy aquí para escuchar a Uds., y si me atrevo a comentarlo, este bello pais de Colombia no necesita tanto más palabras. Necesita urgentemente gente escuchando – escuchando al dolor de las víctimas, escuchando a sus familias, escuchando a sus propuestas para descubrir la verdad – por que sólo escuchando así se puede escuchar el sonido callado del nacimiento de una sociedad más sana, más tolerante, menos violento y más justa.
Comments by Lisa Haugaard, Executive Director of the Latin America Working Group Education Fund
Many thanks to Bob Perillo for his excellent report on an issue that has received far less than the attention it is due.
No group in Colombia has been more specifically singled out for threats and assassination than organized labor, and no group has shown a more daring tenacity in continuing to operate under threat. Here today we are not only condemning these attacks but celebrating the Colombian union movement’s bravery and persistence.
To: Foreign Operations staffers From: Lisa Haugaard
As you consider assistance for Colombia in the foreign operations appropriations bill for FY07, we hope the following information is useful. We strongly support continued assistance for Colombia, but believe it is imperative to readjust the aid package that has been primarily focused on military aid and aerial spraying (82% of U.S. aid since 2000 has been military/police aid).
Despite $4.7 billion invested by the United States in Colombia, the amount of coca planted in Colombia in 2005 was more than when funding began in 2000 (136,200 hectares at the start of Plan Colombia in 2000; 144,000 hectares at the end of 2005, according to the State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2005). Farmers whose crops are sprayed by aerial eradication who are not given adequate economic alternatives are replanting, and coca production is spreading all over the countryside. Coca production in 2005 increased in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. If the goal is to reduce drug abuse at home, resources must be redirected to treatment and prevention at home, and sustainable development alternatives abroad.
Human rights violations remain grave. While there is some reduction in violence due to the demobilization of paramilitary forces, human rights violations continue to be severe in Colombia. The number of people fleeing their homes from political violence increased 8 percent from 2004 to 2005, estimated at 318,387 people displaced in 2005 by the Consultancy on Displacement and Human Rights (CODHES). Moreover, in 2005 more grave violations than in previous years were committed directly by Colombia’s security forces, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ office in Colombia. The office reported “an upward trend” in allegations of extrajudicial executions of civilians and alteration of crime scenes by members of the army.
Cases were denounced of coordinated actions in which the victims were allegedly handed over by paramilitaries, subsequently executed by members of the military, and then presented as members of armed groups killed in combat, particularly in the metropolitan area of Medellín (Antioquia). Another modality was observed in allegations regarding victims executed by paramilitaries and presented by members of the army as killed in combat, in Putumayo and in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. (United Nations’ Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, January 20, 2006, covering the year 2005, Part I, point 29)
Paramilitaries’ criminal and drug-trafficking structures remain largely intact. The demobilization of Colombia’s abusive paramilitary forces if permanent would be a very positive development, but these forces are far from completely dismantled. The OAS monitoring mission has documented the formation of new paramilitary groups and the participation of demobilizing paramilitaries in violent activities in five Colombian provinces, including committing massacres, forming new criminal bands and offering security services to drug traffickers. Paramilitary leaders have penetrated some local and national government structures; the former head of Colombia’s civilian intelligence agency, for example, is facing allegations that he colluded with a paramilitary mob boss in assassinations of civic leaders. Human rights groups and victims’ representatives have had their offices broken into and computer databases stolen, and some have received threatening messages from self-proclaimed new paramilitary groupings. The José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective, for example, which litigates high-profile human rights cases such as the Mapiripán massacre, received this message recently: “This is an invitation to join our crusade against terrorism or your staff will suffer the full weight of our presence, we have the support of the government’s armed forces who always supported us… And to everyone who received a copy of this message I warn you if you don’t align yourselves with this reality it is better for you to take your humanitarian ideas and go to some other place outside of our sacred Colombian territory…”In another recent example, fifteen students, employees and teaching staff at the University of Antioquia just received a death threat from the Autodefensas Unidas de Antioquia, believed to be operating since 1999 (Amnesty International alert 23/023/2006, 16 May 2006).
How should U.S. policy and aid be improved?
In FY07, US assistance should prioritize alternative development and humanitarian aid:
increase focus on alternative development for a more sustainable impact on drug production, rather than pouring resources into expensive, ineffective and inhumane aerial eradication campaigns
increase focus on the victims of violence: humanitarian aid for internally displaced persons and Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities
channel assistance to efforts to strengthen justice, including funding for the Colombia office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and for the Colombian government’s ombudsman’s office, inspector general’s office, and the Attorney General’s human rights unit and unit to implement prosecutions under the paramilitary demobilization law.
In addition, U.S. policy should get tougher in insisting that the Colombian government end impunity and thoroughly dismantle paramilitary and drug trafficking structures:
enforce the human rights conditions in law, requiring the Colombian government to make much greater efforts to investigate and prosecute members of the security forces credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations, and greater efforts to sever all links between the armed forces and illegal armed groups; and
insist that the Colombian government make much more vigorous efforts to fully dismantle paramilitary groups and their financial, criminal and drug trafficking structures; confiscate their financial assets and, particularly, the vast areas of land which they have obtained through violence; return lands to Colombia’s internally displaced persons; and investigate and prosecute new illegal paramilitary groups that are being created.
Additional assistance for expensive helicopters or more military training beyond the enormous investment Colombia already receives will only drain resources from these important goals and will not help Colombia reduce drug production or provide the necessary support to the justice system to strengthen the rule of law.
For more detailed recommendations, see Blueprint for a New Colombia Policywe published with the Center for International Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, and the U.S. Office on Colombia, with input from Colombian civil society organizations.
Washington, DC – This Thursday, Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe will meet with President Bush at his Texas ranch. On Uribe's agenda will be firming up support for billions of dollars in future aid from the United States and his request for millions more to support his plans to demobilize up to 20,000 paramilitary fighters.
"The United States should not be such a pushover in its dealings with the Colombia government," commented Latin America Working Group Education Fund director Lisa Haugaard. "We should get some real progress in strengthening the rule of law in exchange for our billions of dollars in assistance."
Military aid on hold. The White House will be lauding Colombian President Uribe’s accomplishments. But a little-known story is that 12.5% of last year’s military aid was frozen for half the year over lack of progress in cases involving extrajudicial executions and other abuses by Colombia’s military. Under pressure from the U.S. embassy, two cases slowly advanced – on July 12, formal charges were brought against soldiers of the U.S.- funded 18th Brigade for the extrajudicial execution of three trade union leaders in August 2004, and on June 30, arrest warrants were issued for soldiers in the shooting deaths of five members of a family, aged 6 months to 24 years old, in Cajamarca in April 2004. However, this is slow progress, made reluctantly after the Colombian government initially said the unionists died in combat and the family was killed accidentally. Many other cases go nowhere. For example, little progress has been made in investigating the case of two families in San José de Apartadó who were murdered and their bodies dismembered in February 2005, with evidence, according to witness, pointing to soldiers, and the high-profile Mapiripán massacre case is still dragging through the courts.The State Department’s decision to certify that Colombia meets the human rights conditions for the remaining FY04 military aid and 12.5% of FY05 military aid will be controversial. (75% of U.S. military aid through the foreign aid bill is sent without conditions; the remaining 25% is subject to the human rights conditions in law, requiring that the Colombian government make progress in investigating and prosecuting security force members engaged in gross violations of human rights or collaboration with paramilitary forces.)A letter sent by 22 Senators on July 1st called for Secretary Rice “to refrain from certifying that the Colombian government meets the human rights conditions… until further progress is demonstrated.” Click here to see the letter.
"The State Department should use the leverage it has—not give away the store," said Lisa Haugaard. "The price of U.S. assistance should be respect for human rights."
Demobilization funding. President Uribe will also likely be asking for U.S. funding for a controversial plan to demobilize paramilitary fighters. Since 2002, the Colombian government has been engaged in negotiations with illegal paramilitary organizations under the umbrella of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the AUC. The AUC is a major drug trafficking organization, and is also on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations.
In June, the Colombian congress approved a “justice and peace” law that will serve as the legal framework for the ongoing negotiations. The law virtually ensures impunity for paramilitary leaders who have committed human rights and drug trafficking crimes. It provides generous benefits for paramilitary leaders who demobilize, without requiring that they fully dismantle their organizations. Prosecutors will have only 60 days to investigate and charge demobilizing commanders for the atrocious crimes they are alleged to have committed. In Colombia, similar investigations routinely take a year or two before charges are formally filed. Commanders who fail to fully confess their crimes or turn over illegally obtained assets will still enjoy minimal sentences. Commanders do not have to ensure that the men under their command demobilize.
"Of course we support a just and lasting peace in Colombia. That is precisely why, with regret, we have to urge our government not to provide support for the paramilitary demobilization under the current conditions," said Lisa Haugaard. "Where is an honest balance between peace and justice? Where is the truth commission, as in most serious peace processes, or a role for victims in justice and reparations? Most importantly, where is there a guarantee that the paramilitary leaders and drug traffickers will not retain, or even strengthen, their hold over Colombian society? This demobilization is a series of disturbing, unanswered questions. Under these conditions, we should not foot the bill."
Recommendations. The Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy, Washington Office on Latin America and U.S. Office on Colombia produced a Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy that makes ten recommendations for improving U.S. policy to the country.
For more information, contact: Lisa Haugaard, 202-546-7010.
Click here to view a PDF version of the statement.
Congressional Human Rights Caucus, Members’ Briefing Statement by Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group Education Fund
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about this important issue. It is wonderful to have the chance to have the problems affecting Afro-Colombian and indigenous peoples discussed in depth by the caucus. In particular, thanks to Mr. Payne for your leadership on this issue.
It is encouraging to hear from USAID about their efforts to include Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in our development programs, and about the projects specifically directed to these communities. We are very supportive of such programs.
However, it is also important to consider how overall policies by the US and Colombian governments affect Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. My colleagues have given a good account of the impact, and I would like to stress three recommendations for improving U.S. policy to Colombia. These are part of our Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy, which was written with input from some thirty humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental groups working on Colombia issues, including two networks of human rights groups within Colombia. (In English: http://www.lawg.org/docs/Blueprint.pdf ; in Spanish: http://www.lawg.org/docs/LAWGColombiaSP.pdf )
1. We need a tougher human rights policy. There has been very little progress in terms of investigating and prosecuting army officials implicated in human rights violations and collusion with abusive paramilitary forces. The Attorney General last year dismissed charges against General Rito Alejo del Río for allegedly aiding and abetting paramilitary groups and in 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the case against Admiral Rodrigo Quiñonez regarding his leadership during the Chengue massacre—and these are only a couple of the most high-profile cases. There are countless other stalled cases, including ones involving direct violations by the military. Army-paramilitary collusion continues, including in areas like Chocó, with its substantial Afro-Colombian population. We need to be tougher, more willing to criticize. Our embassy must talk about human rights issues publicly, and the State Department must be willing to hold up military aid based on the human rights conditions in the law, and demand real progress on cases and on ending collusion with paramilitary forces. We’re not helping Colombia by pretending that everything’s getting better.
2. We should be emphasizing alternative development programs, not aerial spraying. After the massive spraying campaign in Putumayo province, coca cultivation began spreading to neighboring provinces and increasingly into areas with greater Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations. As frankly cruel as the policy of aerial spraying without alternative development is for all populations of small farm families, it is even more problematic for indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. Already targeted by all sides in the war and feeling the brunt of internal displacement by violence, if forced into displacement from aerial spraying these populations would lose access to the collective land titles which have allowed their communities a certain cohesion. Indigenous communities are in particular rooted to a given piece of land and geography. We need to ask AID and INL to give small farmers in the areas targeted for fumigation a chance to first eradicate manually, with development assistance. Congress should examine these plans carefully and insist that serious alternative development programs be offered to not just a small subset of farmers but, working with the Colombian government and other international donors, ensure that aid is available for the majority of small farm families willing to eradicate.
3. We need to increase and improve assistance for the internally displaced. We need to be offering more aid, more rapid disbursement, and greater protection to prevent displacement. This is Colombia’s most pervasive human tragedy, and Afro-Colombian and indigenous people are disproportionately affected. This kind of humanitarian aid is our best program in Colombia, but it is still a tiny portion of the overall total aid package and far from serving the needs. The Colombian government must be asked to shoulder its share of the burden – its efforts are inadequate – but we should also increase U.S. funding.
We must encourage greater protection of communities from attack from all armed actors. It is important to understand that protection doesn’t come in any automatic way from arming and equipping the Colombian army. The army itself has to be rid of officials and soldiers who are colluding with paramilitaries or committing direct violations. There has to be far greater attention to civilian state agencies helping communities – the Attorney General’s office, the Inspector General’s office, the Ombudsman’s office. Protection comes not only from armed presence but from investigating crimes and ending impunity. If you have armed presence without an accompanying justice system that functions, you are not protecting communities, and indeed you can be putting them at risk.
There must be space for communities who wish to not to participate in the war, including by rejecting the presence of security forces they see as colluding with paramilitary forces in their communities. This is particularly important with indigenous communities, some of which have a traditional culture of nonviolence. These efforts should be respected where possible and certainly should not be seen as a threat to state authority – they are no threat to the state but rather a desperate means of self-preservation that stems in part from lack of trust in government security forces. Finally, the early warning system, designed to protect communities and funded largely by the U.S., must be improved. One of the areas where this system has worked least is in Chocó, with its Afro-Colombian population. The government agencies dealing with security are playing the lead role in determining when alerts are sent out, rather than the judicial agencies, and as a result threats against communities are being downplayed. Responses to alerts that are sent out can help but are inadequate. The system of alerts needs to be made public and transparent.
Thank you so much for your interest in helping Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in Colombia.
The State Department released findings February 28th showing that the cultivation of coca in Colombia decreased in 2002 from 169,800 hectares to 144,450, for a 15% decline after steadily rising rates for several years (including a 25% increase from 2000-2001). While a decline is positive, these figures are somewhat misleading. They mask shifts in production within Colombia and among Andean nations, do not take into account the humanitarian costs of the controversial aerial fumigation policy, and do not answer the question of long-term sustainability. Moreover, they mean relatively little next to one unbudging statistic: the availability of cocaine in the United States has remained stable despite billions of dollars appropriated for supply-side eradication.
In an important note, the most sustainable successes in eradication may be stemming from manual eradication with development aid. In Putumayo province, the center of the aerial fumigation program and the province with greatest reduction in coca, nearly one-half of the drop in coca production in 2002 was actually accomplished by manual eradication with alternative development. Coca was reduced from 47,170 to 13,725 hectares in 2002, and 14,296 hectares have been eradicated manually with US aid, and 11,520 hectares planted with legal crops (Office of the Governor of Putumayo, “For a Legal Putumayo with Social Justice and Zero Coca,” national coca crop census (SIMSI) figures). The farmers who manually eradicate and receive alternative development aid are obviously less likely to move to other areas to replant. The local government of Putumayo continues to press for community-based manual eradication with alternative development as the most sustainable and effective, as well as most humane, method of eradication.
This should be considered as the Congress reviews the 04 budget request for Colombia. In the request, social aid to Colombia, which includes alternative development assistance, has been cut from $164 million in 2003 to $150 million in 2004.
Problems with the coca cultivation figures:
The policy impact must be measured regionally or globally, not country by country. The State Department=s figures show coca cultivation moving back into Peru and Bolivia, to the tune of some 2,000-3,000 hectares apiece—indicating an 8% drop in coca production regionally, not 15% as in Colombia.
The policy impact must be measured over a longer time period. Coca cultivation in the Andes fluctuates from year to year, but has hovered around 200,000 hectares since 1988, according to the State Department figures. Since 1996, when large-scale US-supported fumigation began in Colombia, only four departments had more than 1,000 hectares of coca. Today, at least thirteen have that much coca—despite one million acres being sprayed since.
Availability of cocaine in the United States, the rationale for the policy, remained steady. According to the Office of National Drug Policy’s “Pulse Check: Trends in Drug Abuse,” November 2002, the availability of crack cocaine and powder cocaine “remained stable” from fall 2001 – spring 2002, the latest period covered by Pulse Check.
Moreover, while cocaine and crack use may be leveling off after a period of expansion, use of methamphetamine, a synthetic drug manufactured in the United States and Mexico, is increasing, according to Pulse Check (November 2002). Methamphetamine, which competes for the same users as cocaine, is especially problematic in western states and is on the increase in rural areas.
The figures may not measure the replanting of coca in all areas outside of the target areas that were fumigated. According to the GAO, they are a representative sample of the target country’s known or suspected drug-growing areas (“Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia,” January 8, 2003). Historically, coca has been moved from one area of Colombia to another as eradication efforts forced farmers to pull up stakes. UN Drug Control Programme director for Colombia, Klaus Nyholm, notes that coca-growing is rising in regions bordering Putumayo province (Ibon Villelabeita, “Colombia’s New Coca Assault Hits Crops, Peasants,” Reuters, 2/26/03). Moreover, the satellite pictures upon which the estimate is based were taken directly after the largest spraying campaign ever seen in Colombia, before there was time for replanting. Cultivation may unfortunately bounce back somewhat in a short period.
Measuring success in terms of hectares planted/eradicated does not take into account the increase in coca yield per hectare as higher-yield coca varieties are employed.Social, political & environmental costs:One of the factors behind the movement of coca is the lack of alternatives for coca farmers. US and Colombian-government sponsored alternative development programs lag far behind the spraying program; only a fraction of the areas sprayed are offered alternative development programs. Without alternatives, farmers replant, suffer hunger or pack up and leave, often to replant illicit crops elsewhere. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, referred in a March 5, 2003 speech in Bogota to 12,000 hectares of licit crops supported by USAID (not clear over what time period). The hectares sprayed in 2002 alone total 122,695, or ten times the figure given for USAID-supported alternative development projects.
Social, political & environmental costs:
One of the factors behind the movement of coca is the lack of alternatives for coca farmers. US and Colombian-government sponsored alternative development programs lag far behind the spraying program; only a fraction of the areas sprayed are offered alternative development programs. Without alternatives, farmers replant, suffer hunger or pack up and leave, often to replant illicit crops elsewhere. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, referred in a March 5, 2003 speech in Bogota to 12,000 hectares of licit crops supported by USAID (not clear over what time period). The hectares sprayed in 2002 alone total 122,695, or ten times the figure given for USAID-supported alternative development projects.
Many of the areas targeted are farmed not mainly by traffickers, but by family farmers and indigenous communities. They have turned to this illicit living largely out of desperation. They are often migrants from other areas who moved due to economic hardship or political violence. The one source offering them rural credit, unfortunately, are the traffickers.
Among the indicators of the social impact of fumigation is the dropout rate for children in Putumayo province (site of the most intensive spraying), which according to local officials, rose 40% since 2001 as parents could not afford to send their children to school or pulled their children out of school to follow them and grow coca elsewhere. Ibon Villelabeita, “Colombia’s New Coca Assault Hits Crops, Peasants,” Reuters, 2/26/03.
Aerial fumigation with a broad-spectrum herbicide affects all plants, not just coca and poppy. Therefore, it kills the food crops that farmers intersperse with illicit crops. Most people in areas sprayed not only do not receive long-term development assistance, they also do not receive short-term food aid.
Aerial fumigation campaigns have affected farmers who plant only food crops, including a number of alternative development projects, according to the Colombian government’s ombudsman’s office. While there is supposed to be compensation for farmers whose solely legal crops are destroyed, this mechanism does not exist in practice.
Fumigation adds to the problem of displacement. According to the Washington Post, some 9,000 people fled Putumayo between January and November 2002 due to fumigation and a lack of alternative sources of income (Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Air Assault on Coca Leaves Crop, Farmers in Its Dust,” Washington Post, 11/13/02). In a country where 350,000 people were displaced in 2002 primarily due to political violence, a policy intentionally increases displacement should be controversial.
While the State Department for years brushed aside complaints of impact to human health, the EPA found in September 2002 that the spray mixture being used could cause eye damage, a finding that found echo in the numbers of complaints of eye irritation that had been lodged with local Colombian government personnel. The spray mixture was changed to address this, but there are still many unknowns.
As to environmental impact, according to Anna Cederstav, staff scientist with Earthjustice, “The widespread spraying and drift of a potent herbicide that kills most plants is devastating thousands of acres of important habitat in Colombia. The potential impacts to native flora and wildlife are unknown because the herbicide hasn’t been studied in these tropical ecosystems. Further, most coca and poppy farmers just replant or clear new plots in the forest. Because the State Department only reports on current crop acreage, there is no way to assess how the eradication program is accelerating the loss of Amazonian forests.” (“Coca Cultivation in Colombia: The Story Behind the Numbers,” press statement, 2/27/03)
Eradication without alternatives is pushing farmers into the ranks of the armed groups, which feed on the desperation of rural communities by actively recruiting and offering food and a salary. This development runs counter to the goals of the policy, which included a strengthening of the state in rural areas. To consolidate support in the countryside, the Colombian government needs to make progress in delivering the most basic social services—health, education, roads, agricultural extension services—to extend a positive government presence in marginal areas.
The eradication program in Colombia has two major goals: reducing the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States, and helping the Colombian government reestablish control over the countryside. Yet despite the 2002 drop in coca production, to date the aerial fumigation policy does not appear to have made much progress towards those two major goals. On the first, cocaine use remains stable, while use of a similar drug, methamphetamine, appears to be on the increase. On the second goal, the policy will cut into the armed groups’ profits on the drug trade, but so far this does not appear to have a substantial impact. Moreover, fumigation without sufficient alternatives undercuts the Colombian government’s legitimacy in the countryside and is likely adding to the armed groups’ supply of recruits.
While the larger aim of limiting drug abuse is laudable, the tactics must be examined. This controversial and costly policy—Colombia is the only country in the world where large-scale aerial fumigation is applied—merits scrutiny. Is this the most effective policy with the least negative side effects? Could another eradication strategy, with greater attention to a sustainable demand reduction strategy through treatment and prevention, be more effective with less damage to people and the environment?
The $1.3 billion aid package passed last year, marking a dramatic escalation of US involvement in Colombia, carries with it many risks and involves many unanswered questions. In the months leading up to its passage, the Clinton Administration and congressional backers painted an optimistic picture of the package's potential to help Colombia deal with its complex problems, while critics warned of dire consequences.
Now that the package is a reality, it would be wise to take a more careful look at the risks and uncertainties posed by this policy before appropriating more funding. Frequently, the questions asked about Colombia counternarcotics policy are limited in scope-is the right equipment being delivered on time? How many hectares of coca are being eradicated?
Here are ten unanswered questions policymakers should be asking.
