

Negative Consequences of Ending Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in El Salvador and Honduras for U.S. Interests in Promoting Prosperity, Security, and Governance in the Northern Triangle

NOTE: This document focuses on the negative implications of ending TPS in terms of its repercussions for Central America and undermining U.S. foreign policy interests and investments in that region. This is not to overlook the profound human, economic, and social costs to the United States of ending TPS for people who have deep roots in this country. These costs have been thoroughly documented, most recently in studies by [Immigrant Legal Resource Center \(ILRC\)](#) and [Center for Migration Studies](#), and by researchers at the [Center for Migratory Research](#) at the University of Kansas, with the support of migrant organizations.¹

The United States has allocated more than \$1.3 billion USD to the [U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America](#) since it was approved in 2014. The current Trump Administration budget proposal would push that to \$1.8 billion. The strategy describes three lines of work—Prosperity, Security, and Governance—aimed at moving toward “sustained, broad-based economic growth, better government performance, and improved security conditions” and “advance[ing] economic and social inclusion and safeguard[ing] citizen safety and security.” At the Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America in Miami this past June, Vice President Pence affirmed the U.S. government’s commitment to a “stronger, safer, and more prosperous Central America.”

Ending TPS for Hondurans and El Salvadorans would have profound negative impacts on these goals, undermining U.S. investments in improved security, prosperity, and governance in the region.

Section 1: Undermining Public Safety and Security

Deported TPS beneficiaries would be returning to an extremely unstable security situation in both El Salvador and Honduras. Their vulnerability may be higher than most deported migrants who have only been in the United States a short period of time, as they may have limited familial and social networks and knowledge of the country due to their long time away from El Salvador and Honduras. This would also imply a limited network to provide them with protection in precarious situations, forcing them to go underground into hiding, to enter the informal economy, or to flee the country again.

The two countries have held a grim competition for the title of world’s most dangerous country in terms of murder per capita in the last several years. Though official statistics of homicides at a national level for both El Salvador and Honduras decreased in 2016, homicides remain extremely high, particularly in the cities where TPS recipients are likely to return, and some other crimes are on the rise. The security situation for the average citizen remains extremely precarious. The World Economic Forum ranked El Salvador as the world’s third most dangerous country and Honduras as the world’s ninth most dangerous country in 2016. Levels of internal displacement are high in both countries, and internal displacement is often a precursor to migration. Returned

migrants would also be at high risk for extortion and being targeted for gang recruitment, thus potentially strengthening organized crime networks in the region.

1.1 Security Challenges in Honduras

Honduras' homicide rate in 2016 is still dangerously high at 59 per 100,000.² Rates are even higher in the two principal cities, to which many TPS recipients would likely return if deported: Tegucigalpa (86 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) and San Pedro Sula (112 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). San Pedro Sula, to which deported Hondurans are flown by the United States, was ranked the most dangerous city in the world in 2016.³

Moreover, the levels of femicide (gender-motivated killings of women) have increased significantly in 2017 with 187 women murdered so far between January and June.⁴ In addition, during the first six months of 2017, the same numbers of LGBTI individuals have already been murdered as during all of 2016.⁵ Finally, there has been an increase in multiple homicides or massacres, the killing of three people or more in the same location and context, including of minors and children during the first six months of 2017.⁶ Levels of other crimes, including extortion, kidnapping, domestic abuse, and sexual violence, remain high and generate internal displacement.

Internal displacement is substantial and ongoing. According to the Honduran National Human Rights Commission, there was a 22% increase in the registered cases of forced internal displacement or risk of the same from January to May 2017 compared with the same time period in 2016.⁷ A 2015 study by the Inter-Institutional Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence, made up of government, UN Refugee Agency, and civil society representatives, found 174,000 people were internally displaced in the 20 municipalities they surveyed.⁸ While the Honduran government recognizes the existence of internal displacement, the legislature has failed to pass a draft law on internal displacement that has been in discussion for several years. Incipient efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs to relocate internally displaced persons at grave risk only cover small numbers of those in need.

Honduras's human rights protection systems remain extremely weak. A human rights ministry announced by the government does not yet exist. A mechanism to protect human rights defenders and journalists covers less than a hundred people with minimal protection measures. Child protection services and programs to address domestic violence are inadequate and fail to protect women and children from domestic and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, or to provide critically needed services.⁹ And, perhaps most concerning is the low rate of effective investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Honduras, "impunity in Honduras is at a historical high and is a key factor contributing to violence and insecurity."¹⁰

While a police reform effort has resulted in a substantial purging of the police force, few of the police removed have been investigated and prosecuted. Honduras also continues to rely on Military Police, military soldiers with minimal police training who conduct sweeps and patrolling

of neighborhoods but lack the training, to conduct investigations that are key to sustainably reducing crimes. These forces have committed a number of human rights violations. Operations by the Military Police in neighborhoods to target gang members often do not provide local community members with protection, may lead to reprisals and heightened gang recruitment once they leave, or can send gang members out to rural areas where there was not previously a presence.

1.2 Security Challenges in El Salvador

El Salvador's homicide rate was ranked the highest in Latin America, with 81.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016.¹¹ In El Salvador, the crimes of extortion, kidnapping, and rape continue unabated. Femicides decreased slightly from January to February 2017 but increased again in March of the same year.¹²

The Salvadoran government has, on paper, a balanced security strategy in *Plan Salvador Seguro*. However, what is most evident is a "*mano dura*" state security strategy focused on cracking down on gangs that is accompanied by serious human rights abuses. According to the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016, "As of October the attorney general was investigating 53 possible cases of extrajudicial killings. One took place in 2013, none in 2014, 11 in 2015, and 41 in 2016."¹³ Cases of excessive use of force, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions by the police continue to be documented by the government's Ombudsman Office on Human Rights (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos, PDDH), NGOs, and the media. According to one recent study, 51% of respondents considered the police to be corrupt in some way.¹⁴

As in Honduras, NGOs that work with targeted communities say that police and military operations to rid communities of gang members can lead to reprisals against community members and increased recruitment when the security forces withdraw, and can push gang members to new areas where they had not been previously - contributing to levels of internal displacement.

Internal displacement in El Salvador is widespread though insufficiently documented. As the 2016 State Department Report on Human Rights Practices summed up, "According to the most recent poll conducted in December 2014 by IUDOP-UCA, 4.6 percent of surveyed citizens reported being internally displaced due to violence and the threat of violence and 8 percent reported having tried to migrate to another country for the same reasons. In 2015, the NGO International Rescue Committee estimated that the number of displaced individuals was approximately 324,000, or 5.2 percent of the country's population."¹⁵ In El Salvador, from January to July 2017, the Civil Society Working Group on Internal Displacement documented as examples 53 cases of violence and forced displacement affecting 256 individuals. The most common reasons behind the displacement were the murder of a relative, attempted murder, or rape.¹⁶ As in Honduras, the Salvadoran child protection system is rife with weaknesses and protections for women and children survivors of domestic and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence are practically non-existent. For crimes of this nature that do get reported, there is a 95% impunity rate.¹⁷

The Salvadoran government does not recognize internal displacement and, as a result, there are no government services specifically for internally displaced persons. El Salvador's small and dense population and the national reach of the gangs make it difficult to internally relocate persons at risk safely.

1.3 Returned migrants vulnerable to extortion, fuel organized crime and gangs

Extortion is a major problem in El Salvador and Honduras. Salvadorans and Hondurans pay an estimated \$390 million and \$200 million, respectively, in annual extortion fees to organized crime groups.¹⁸ Extortion is the “economic engine behind gangs and represents the largest share of gang income.”¹⁹ The amount of extortion money collected in Honduras is higher than the federal budget dedicated to security and to health.²⁰ Nearly 80% of registered small businesses in Honduras report having been extorted.²¹ According to the Honduran Chamber of Commerce, 72,000 jobs have been lost due to the collection of “war tax” or extortion, and at least 18,000 businesses have been closed.²²

Primary targets for extortion include taxi drivers, public transportation operators, small businesses, merchants, residents of poor neighborhoods, and individuals with family members in the United States. Deportation of TPS holders who have lived in the United States for longer than a decade would prove a boon to the extortion industry. This population is viewed as having resources – and community and gang members have observed family members of TPS holders in El Salvador and Honduras receiving the benefit of money to support education, housing, and other costs. These very same family members in El Salvador and Honduras have sometimes been targets of extortion themselves – based on the very fact of having a family member who lives in the United States.²³ Some cases in the Central American Minor in-country refugee processing program (CAM) have involved Salvadoran youth threatened with harm, death, rape, or kidnapping unless their parent in the U.S. provided money to a gang.²⁴

In addition to creating new extortion opportunities, deported TPS holders also provide a new source of potential recruits for gangs, given their vulnerability and lack of support network in Honduras and El Salvador. Addressing extortion and gangs are two U.S. priorities in the region, yet deporting the Honduran and Salvadoran TPS holding population works directly against these priorities.

Section 2: Threats to Prosperity in the Northern Triangle

Few would argue with Vice President Pence's call at the June 2017 Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America, for “work[ing] together... to provide more people with a path out of poverty –to give the citizens of Central America a better path and a brighter future.” Now and for the foreseeable future, remittances will be both a de facto social safety net in the region and a significant source of income for the national treasuries of both Honduras and El Salvador.

2.1. Remittances as social safety net

In 2016, El Salvador received \$4.58 billion in remittances, the largest amount ever, and especially startling when compared to a generously calculated total of \$2.6 billion for all US formal economic activity, including foreign direct investment.²⁵ Remittances, contributed by the estimated 2 million Salvadorans living in the United States, provided almost twice as much as total U.S. public and private sector investments combined in 2016. Honduras received more than \$3.6 billion in remittances during the same period. Official statistics put this amount at more than 17% of total GDP for both countries.²⁶

Two recent studies by the Inter-American Development Bank described the role of remittances as a social safety net in El Salvador and Honduras.²⁷ According to that research, one in every five people in El Salvador and one in six in Honduras receives remittances. Of those, about 70% are women in both countries. In El Salvador, 79% are low-income or poor households; that number rises to 83% in Honduras. About 90% in both countries reported using remittances to cover basic expenses on a monthly basis. If TPS ends, the negative consequences will be swift and severe for the economies of these countries and their families who depend on remittances.

2.2 Ending TPS would remove an important source of contributions to the tax base of El Salvador and Honduras.

The U.S. strategy for improving prosperity in Central America, as articulated in the State Department materials and reiterated by Vice President Pence in June, emphasizes the importance of tax collection as an engine for sustaining long-term improvements in security and governance. There is ample evidence that TPS holders are a significant source of Value Added Tax (VAT) revenues. A 2008 study conducted by the Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE) in El Salvador, the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (recently renamed Alianza Americas), and the Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) showed that remittances accounted for nearly 13% of total VAT collection in El Salvador. The sum contributed to VAT from remittances exceeded the total amount that El Salvador spent on anti-poverty programs that year by more than 600%.²⁸

Removing this important source of tax revenue could be extremely destabilizing to countries that are already struggling to produce enough tax revenues to cover security, governance and anti-poverty programs.

Section 3: Lack of capacity for Return/Reintegration Undermines Other Governance and Security Objectives

The U.S. State Department governance goals include improved systems for return/reintegration of returned (deported) migrants, judicial reform, transparency, and protection of human rights. All of these goals would be undermined by ending TPS. This section will focus on the negative impacts of overloading already fragile and inadequate systems for return and reintegration.

3.1 Overload systems for return/reintegration.

In addition to the inadequate conditions for safe return described in Section 1, return and reintegration services for migrants reflect the overall weakness of Salvadoran and Honduran governments to provide basic services to their citizens. Both El Salvador and Honduras have only incipient, small programs to receive deported migrants. These programs are currently unable to support the flow of deported migrants and are often limited to reception services next to airports in each country to receive deportees from the United States and centers along borders to receive deportees from Mexico. There are no comprehensive programs to support their reintegration into society and to ensure migrants do not fall prey to dangerous situations once again that may lead to increased internal displacement or remigration. A larger group of deported migrants, such as TPS beneficiaries, would overwhelm this system even more.

Neither country provides services that successfully facilitate access to education, employment, or healthcare for the majority of deported migrants. Case management models that follow up with deported migrants to ensure that they do not fall into precarious situations are run by a limited number of churches and NGOs, and are already overburdened. Lack of services, support, and follow up for deported migrants leaves the most vulnerable with no choice but to flee again.

3.2 Return and Reintegration Challenges in Honduras

Deported Hondurans go through the Honduran government's official repatriation at Centers for the Care of the Returned Migrant (CAMR, acronym in Spanish), currently located at three different points in the country. Children and families deported by land go through the repatriation process at the El Belen repatriation center in San Pedro Sula while single adults go through the process in Omoa. Deportations by plane (presumably all those coming from the U.S.) would be processed at the La Lima airport center.

Government staff and the organizations that ensure that Honduran citizens are repatriated safely into the country are already at full capacity. An increase in deportations of Honduran citizens created by a loss of TPS would be unmanageable. The government has neither the physical capacity nor trained staff to accommodate the basic repatriation process that all migrants must go through upon return.

Beyond the approximately hour-long repatriation process, capacity to provide reintegration services to returned migrants is even scarcer.

Services for repatriated migrants by government entities and nonprofits are limited by location, age, and other qualifying criteria, which means that the vast majority of deported migrants have no support upon return to their country. Currently, nonprofits can support a small number of returned young people in San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, and Olancho. These nonprofits provide psychosocial support, a key piece of successful reintegration, and vocational training for young people to have economic opportunities in their country. The Honduran government also has programs to provide services for deported migrants. However, those programs only have the capacity to serve a small number of the currently returned migrants, lack vital psychosocial and

individual accompaniment, and are not easily accessed by migrants. The local nonprofits building repatriation and reintegration models that can, alongside policy changes, make a lasting impact in the lives of young people who migrated would be unable to provide services and operate successfully if TPS holders were deported.

3.3 Return and Reintegration Challenges in El Salvador

Similar to Honduras, the Salvadoran government and nonprofits offer programs to deported Salvadorans that are limited in capacity and scope. The Salvadoran government has the Consejo Nacional para la Protección y Desarrollo de la Persona Migrante y su Familia (CONMIGRANTES) through its foreign ministry that is meant to provide access to reintegration services for returned Salvadoran migrants through Departmental Committees for Human Mobility. These committees were created in the departments of Usulután, Chalatenango, La Libertad, and Santa Ana in 2015.²⁹ Information about their outcomes and scale is not easily available. Government reports suggest that the current programs may reach only a tiny fraction of returned migrants. The Salvadoran government reports having provided training in construction work to some 14 returned migrants.³⁰ While these efforts to provide opportunities to migrants could serve as models, these government programs serve a very small percentage of the returned population and lack vital psychosocial support. Any increase in deportations though the loss of TPS would immediately overburden these fledgling governmental programs to serve migrants. In addition, a few nonprofits and churches also have programs to assist returned adult migrants, but their capacity is also very limited. An increase in deportations would make it impossible for governments and nonprofits to provide basic services.

3.4 Pressure on other fragile governance systems including anti-violence and human rights protections

According to Cristosal, a human rights organization in El Salvador that works with internally displaced individuals, “in our documentation of people internally displaced by violence and returned migrants with special protection needs, the overwhelming perception of the these vulnerable populations is that the state is unwilling or incapable of protecting victims of violence. 63% of our cases of internal displacement last year refused to denounce crimes they suffered, because they believe the Salvadoran authorities to be unable to respond and to be infiltrated by organized crime, or because they fear reprisals by their persecutors. This indicates a crisis of governance and rule of law in El Salvador, and this crisis would be significantly undermined by an influx of returned TPS holders that would overwhelm already collapsing state protection and reintegration capacity.”³¹

For more information, contact the authors:

Lisa Frydman, **Kids in Need of Defense (KIND)** - lfrydman@supportkind.org

Lisa Haugard, **Latin America Working Group (LAWG)** - lisah@lawg.org

Amy Shannon, **Alianza Americas** - ashannon@alianzaamericas.org

Alaide Vilchis-Ibarra, **Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA)**- Alaide.VilchisIbarra@elca.org

-
- ¹ Amanda Baran, Jose Magaña-Salgado, and Tom K. Wong, *Economic Contributions by Salvadoran, Honduran, and Haitian TPS holders*, comp. Immigration Legal Research Center (ILRC), April 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-04-18-economic-contributions-by-salvadoran-honduran-and-haitian-tps-holders.pdf>.
- Robert Warren and Donald Kerwin, "A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti," *Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS)* 5, no. 3 (2017): accessed August 21, 2017, <file:///C:/Users/lfolkerts/Downloads/99-337-3-PB.pdf>.
- Cecilia Menjívar, *The Experiences of Honduran and Salvadoran Immigrants*, comp. The University of Kansas, Center for Migration Research, May 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, http://ipsr.ku.edu/migration/pdf/TPS_Report.pdf.
- ² David Gagne, "InSight Crime's 2016 Homicide Round-up," *InSight Crime*, January 16, 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-2016-homicide-round-up>.
- ³ Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal A.C., *Metodología del ranking (2016) de las 50 ciudades más violentas del mundo*, April 6, 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/prensa/send/6-prensa/239-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-del-mundo-2016-metodologia>.
- ⁴ "187 Women Murdered in Honduras in 2017," *teleSUR*, July 24, 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.telesur.net/english/news/187-Women-Murdered-in-Honduras-in-2017-20170724-0028.html>.
- ⁵ Red Lesbica Cattrachas, interview, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, July 24, 2017.
- ⁶ Casa Alianza, *Informe mensual de la situación de los derechos de las niñas, niños y jóvenes en Honduras*, 30-31, June 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.casa-alianza.org/hn/images/documentos/CAH.2017/1.Inf.Mensuales/6.%20informe%20mensual%20junio%202017.pdf>.
- ⁷ Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CONADEH) Honduras, *Boletín estadístico sobre el desplazamiento forzado interno: identificación de casos en los registros de quejas en cinco oficinas del CONADEH*, June 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://app.conadeh.hn/descargas/Boletin%20Estad%3%ADstico%20UDFI-CONADEH.pdf>.
- ⁸ Joint IDP Profiling Service, "Characterization of Internally Displaced Populations in Honduras", Nov. 2015, <http://www.jips.org/en/news/latest-news/violence-induced-internal-displacement-in-honduras>
- ⁹ Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) and Human Rights Center Fray Matías de Córdova, *Childhood Cut Short: Sexual and Gender-based Violence Against Central American Migrant and Refugee Children*, June 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://supportkind.org/resources/childhood-cut-short/>.
- ¹⁰ OACNUDH Honduras, <http://www.oacnudh.hn>, accessed August 21, 2017
- ¹¹ Gagne, "InSight Crime."
- ¹² ORMUSA, "Indicadores de Violencia: Disminuyen feminicidios en primer trimestre de 2017, en comparación de 2016, sin embargo, se elevan en marzo" [Indicators of Violence: Reduced Femicides in the first third of 2017, in comparison to 2016, however, they rised in March], accessed August 21, 2017, <http://observatoriodeviolencia.ormusa.org/>.
- ¹³ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, El Salvador report", accessed August 21, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper>.
- ¹⁴ José Miguel Cruz, Jeannette Aguilar, and Yulia Vorobyeva, *Legitimidad y confianza pública de la policía en El Salvador*, comp. FIU Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center and Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica, July 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/Legitimidad-y-confianza.pdf>
- ¹⁵ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports."
- ¹⁶ Cristosal, "UN Expert on Internal Displacement Visits El Salvador," last modified August 21, 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.cristosal.org/news/2017/7/31/impact-report-january-june-2017>.
- ¹⁷ Kids in Need of Defense (KIND), *Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and Gender-based Violence and Gang Violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala*, May 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Neither-Security-nor-Justice-SGBV-Gang-Report-FINAL.pdf>.
- ¹⁸ "'Imperios de la extorsión' están en Honduras y El Salvador" ["Extortion Empires" are in Honduras and El Salvador], *La Prensa*, July 1, 2015, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/854572-410/imperios-de-la-extorsi%C3%B3n-est%C3%A1n-en-honduras-y-el-salvador>.

-
- ¹⁹ International Crisis Group, *Mafia of the Poor: Gang Violence and Extortion in Central America*, report no. 62, April 6, 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/es/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/62-mafia-poor-gang-violence-and-extortion-central-america>.
- ²⁰ "La extorsión desangra al Triángulo Norte" [The Extortion Bleeds the Northern Triangle], *La Prensa*, October 17, 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1009131-410/la-extorsi%C3%B3n-desangra-al-tri%C3%A1ngulo-norte>.
- ²¹ International Crisis Group, *Mafia of the Poor*.
- ²² United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, comp., *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons on his mission to Honduras*, report no. A/HRC/32/35/Add.4, April 5, 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/G1606868.pdf>.
- ²³ According to conversations with Casa Alianza and El Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente, a civil society organization in El Salvador focused on labor rights and migration, gangs frequently target for extortion individuals known to have family in the U.S. – as they are perceived to have resources.
- ²⁴ Data from the Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente, civil society organization in El Salvador offering support to some youth with pending CAM cases.
- ²⁵ Manuel Orozco, Laura Porras, and Julia Yansura, *The Continued Growth of Family Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2015*, comp. Inter-American Dialogue, February 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2015-Remittances-to-LAC-2122016.pdf>.
- ²⁶ KNOMAD and World Bank Group, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016*, 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23743/9781464803192.pdf>.
- ²⁷ Lukas Keller and Rebecca Rouse, *Remittance Recipients in El Salvador*, comp. Multilateral Investment Funds, September 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://www.estudiosdemigracion.org/english/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IADB-Remittance-Recipients-in-El-Salvador-2016.pdf>.
- Lukas Keller and Rebecca Rouse, *Remittance Recipients in Honduras*, comp. Multilateral Investment Funds, September 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, <https://www.estudiosdemigracion.org/english/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IADB-Remittance-Recipients-in-Honduras-2016.pdf>
- ²⁸ NALACC et al., *Paying Their Share: Migrants' contribution to fiscal health in Mexico and El Salvador*, 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.alianzaamericas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Paying_their_share.pdf.
- ²⁹ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador, "Connigrantes presenta informe de las acciones ejecutadas durante el último año" [Connigrantes presents report on executive orders during the last year], last modified September 28, 2016, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.rree.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=6178:connigrantes-presenta-informe-de-las-acciones-ejecutadas-durante-el-ultimo-ano&Itemid=1770.
- ³⁰ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador, "Gobierno salvadoreño certifica competencias de personas retornadas para el área de construcción" [Salvadoran government certifies skills of returnees to the construction area], last modified June 6, 2017, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.rree.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=6779:gobierno-salvadoreno-certifica-competencias-de-personas-retornadas-para-el-area-de-construccion&Itemid=1770.
- ³¹ Email exchange with Noah Bullock, executive director, Cristosal, August 4, 2017.